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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Maxwell Robert Mindock
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
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Title: Essays on the Judiciary.
The complexities of the Judicial system provides unique research opportu-
nities to model and learn about human behavior. Whether it be the opinions
of United States Supreme Court Justices or the length of time a defendant
is sentenced to incarceration, judicial outcomes are of extreme importance
to all involved. In this thesis, I study vote determination on the Supreme
Court, finding evidence of systematic variation in vote dependencies that align
with Justice partisanship, sentencing cohort effects within criminal sentencing,
finding evidence judges do not sentence defendants independently of other
defendants, and multiplicity effects within criminal sentencing, finding evidence
judges do not sentence offenses independently among defendants with multiple
offenses and that the black-white racial gap in sentencing is larger than previ-
ously thought. This dissertation includes previously unpublished co-authored
material.
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CHAPTER I
VOTE INFLUENCE IN GROUP DECISION-MAKING: PARTY
IMBALANCE AND INDIVIDUAL IDEOLOGY ON THE SUPREME
COURT
The first chapter of this dissertation, titled, “Vote Influence in Group
Decision-Making: Party Imbalance and Individual Ideology on the Supreme
Court,” and the third chapter, titled, “Multiple Offenses, Concurrent
Sentencing, and Racial Gaps in Sentencing Outcomes,” have a co-author, Glen
Waddell. I have fully participated in every aspect of the process—initial
research design, data acquisition, empirical methods, and both the writing and
continued revision of research output.
1.1 Introduction
Collaborative decision-making is typically a process of aggregating
conflicted positions into a single position. Within many organizations,
however, while there are individual ideological positions at play, there are also
implicit associations, or potential vote-sharing relationships that may change
the nature of deliberation. Corporate Boards, for example, often have both
inside directors (e.g., large stakeholders, the Chief Executive Officer, other
executives of the organization) and outside directors, with no direct
connections to the organization but with experience that may represent
associated interests, who can bring balance to the interests of insiders as they
are unlikely to tolerate “insider dealing.” Academic units can even experience
conflict when making hiring decisions, as fundamental positions are often in
competition for fixed resources—the seeming imbalance of one over the other
may well influence the nature of those decisions or the relationships implicated
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in coming to those decisions.
A large literature exists in which researchers theoretically examine
collaborative decision-making in committees (e.g., see Buchanan and Tullock
(1999); Li et al. (2001); Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001); Levy (2007)). Yet,
empirical applications remain relatively unexplored. In this paper we consider
one such decision-making environment—the Supreme Court of the United
States (SCOTUS)—and the nature of decision making as the balance of the
court changes. In doing so, we find empirical evidence that the greater is the
imbalance in party affiliation (a six-three court is more imbalanced than a
five-four court, for example) the less within-party dependency we find in
Justice votes—a simple model that explains this would have Justices
more-likely anticipate being the marginal voter on a five-four court, for
example. To the contrary, as imbalance rises, we find a larger role for
individual ideology in determining Justice voting behavior, as though the a
priori closeness of votes based on political positions had shut down on
information sharing across party, and moving priors away from five-four
decisions opens up the potential to be influenced by those across the party
divide but close in ideology space. The Supreme Court provides a unique
opportunity to test such a hypothesis, as it offers exogenous changes in
affiliation balance that corporate boards would not, for example.1
In the last 60 years, the country has shifted more broadly toward
political polarization— differences in the ideological positions of the median
Democrat and the median Republican in the U.S. Congress have increased by
53 percent (Poole, 2005), and Americans are themselves increasingly more
1 See Manski (2000) for discussion of the challenges of empirically estimating social
interactions.
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politically polarized (Center, 2014).2 At some level, this shift is also evident at
the Supreme Court.
In Figure 1 we plot the appointing-President’s party affiliation for each of
the Justices on the Court between 1969 and 2014. In so doing, we also
rank-order the Justices by a measure of their political ideology, illustrating the
relative ideologies of the appointments to the Court over time.3 At the same
time we plot the mean ideology over the time-series, which highlights the
overall rise in the Court’s ideological polarization, with newly appointed
Justices tending to increase the ideological distance between the average
Republican and Democrat appointees. This figure also makes evident that the
separate identification of the roles of party affiliation and Justice ideology is
increasingly challenging over time. However, for as long a time series as is
estimable (i.e., there is identifying variation in terms 1969 through 1990), our
analysis will reveal a story that implicates party and ideology differently.
That said, it is uninteresting to demonstrate that Justice votes have an
ideological component—in fact, throughout our analysis we will absorb all
such justice-specific leanings into Justice fixed effects. We will also estimate
separate models by term of the Court, which implicitly relaxes even the
restriction that the ideologies of individual Justices map into votes similarly
over time. (For example, though Souter was appointed by a Republican, he is
thought to have become a reliable liberal vote on the Court over time.)
Instead, then, we contribute to understanding the interactions of decision
makers in groups with potentially conflicting interests, and to knowledge of
Supreme Court decision-making in particular.
2 Roughly 92 percent of those who identify as Republican now measurably more con-
servative (on issues) than the median Democrat, and 94 percent of those who identify as
Democrat now more liberal than the median Republican. (Only twenty years ago, these
same metrics were 64 and 70 percent.)
3 This measure, introduced in Bonica et al. (2017b), is in no part determined by their
actions as a SCOTUS Justices.
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Figure 1: Justice ideology and party affiliation
Notes: In each term, the Justices are ranked from most liberal (1) to most
conservative (9). Each line represents the ordinal ranking for a single Justice
throughout her career. As Justices have a fixed ideology across all terms, changes in
rank occur to the arrival and departure of Justices. The connected scatter plot,
associated with the right vertical axis, displays the mean (cardinal) ideology of
Justices, separately for Republican and Democrat appointees to the Court.
Although Supreme Court decisions are public, as are the final outcomes
of most collaborative decision-making bodies, the actual deliberations and
voting are quite secretive, occurring to the exclusion of all but the nine
Justices themselves. While unobservable, there are well-developed techniques
that allow one to retrieve measure the potential co-variation in the outcomes
of those deliberations that can be informative.
We do so here, modeling the votes of Supreme Court Justices inclusive of
a “spatial-lag” parameter—a parameter for each term of the Court that
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reflects the degree to which the direction of a Justice’s vote on a given case is
predictable by the votes of other Justices.4 In so doing, we are estimating a
dependency of sorts, within subsets of “spaces” that define potential
relationships among the nine Justices. Our econometric procedure eliminates
the concern the estimated dependencies are influenced by shared unobserved
elements, which impact multiple votes simultaneously, allowing for a causal
interpretation of the effect of one vote on another—a vote dependency. Our
identification is not defeated by sources of unobserved heterogeneity across
case- or justice-specific attributes—these sources of variation are absorbed into
case-specific and justice-specific fixed effects. Neither do our estimates identify
off of unobserved case-by-justice heterogeneity—any correlation in unobserved
case-by-justice heterogeneity is removed from identifying variation through our
empirical approach.
In the end, we estimate the extent to which shared party affiliations
shape vote dependencies among Justices on the Court.5 Doing so, we find
strong evidence of such dependencies. More striking, even, is that the degree
of measurable voting dependency is systematic with the a priori imbalance of
potential voting blocks on the Court. That is, the revealed strength of vote
dependency within groups of party affiliated Justices decreases abruptly when
the party imbalance of the Court increases from five Republicans and four
Democrats (from 1969 to 1970), to six and three (from 1971 to 1974), and
again when the Court becomes seven and two (from 1975 to 1990). Moreover,
we find no such evidence around changes in the Court’s makeup that do not
imply changes to party imbalance.
This is consistent with party affiliation playing a smaller role in voting
4 A rather large literature in spatial econometrics follows the advances in Anselin (1988),
LeSage and Pace (2004), and LeSage and Pace (2009) and elsewhere.
5 We use the appointing President’s party as a measure of the political party of the
Justice, common in the literature (e.g., see Sunstein et al. (2006)).
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when there is more imbalance in the party affiliation of Justices. For example,
in 1969 and 1970, party affiliations would leave any individual Justice as the
potential marginal vote, an expectation that could lead Justices to be more
aware of their role in determining the aggregate outcome, and their party
affiliated Justices’ votes. While there need not be measurable dependencies of
any kind, coincident with dependencies within party affiliations attenuating as
the structure of the Court changes over time, we find an increase in
ideology-driven vote dependencies. In particular, we find dependencies across
party affiliations between Justices who are individually the most similar to
each other in their ideology.6 -squares estimates can exhibit bias in the
presence of spatial dependency, spatial dependency is both measurable and
interpretable.
As all voting dependencies can represent various forms of information
sharing or learning, normative evaluations of dependency itself should be made
with great care. As such, we do not ourselves take a position on whether
partisan or ideological dependency is itself to be praised.7 However, as we
uncover systematic variation in how votes co-vary, and how this co-variation
changes as the structural makeup of the court itself changes, we are tempted
to interpret the data as suggestive of mechanisms other than simple notions of
information sharing and learning, which should not vary with the Court’s
partisan structure. In particular, it cannot be ignored that the relationship
between the votes of party affiliated Justices is strongest when the structure of
the Court leaves the highest potential for one Justice to be the marginal vote
on a case (i.e., a five-four margin).
In Section 1.2 we provide a brief summary of the Supreme Court as an
6 Berdejó and Chen (2017) similarly finds that partisan voting among US Court of Appeals
Judges varies with whether or not it is a presidential-election year.
7 See Nivola (2009) and Galston (2009) for normative discussions regarding partisan
politics.
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institution, and the lifecycle of a SCOTUS cases. In this section, we also
provide a review of the relevant literature to which we contribute. In Section
1.3, we formally motivate our estimated equation and describe our data, which
we follow in Section 1.4 with a presentation of empirical results and discussion.
In Section 1.5, we offer concluding remarks.
1.2 Background
Here, we offer context for the empirical application, and follow up with a
review of the relevant literature, to which we contribute.
1.2.1 The institution of the Supreme Court
Each of the nine Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States
(SCOTUS) is appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and
expected to hold office for life. Among the oaths taken upon confirmation,
Justices commit to faithfully and impartially perform the duties of the Court.
Yet, the rancor associated with judicial appointments to the Court suggests
that some question this impartiality.8 It is as though judicial appointments are
political in part, and a lifetime of court rulings may be moved one way or the
other by the political persuasions of the Justices, either individually or in the
collective.9
Once a case is submitted to the Supreme Court, there are potentially
four stages to the progression of the typical case. First, in one of the
8 See, for example, Bonica and Sen (2017) for an empirical examination of partisan and
ideological considerations in the Judicial selection process.
9 After the Republican-controlled Senate refused to consider a 2016 Obama-nominated
replacement for the deceased Justice Scalia, the nomination process appeared to reach a new
level of polarization. Since the 2017 installation of President Trump, the nomination process
for Federal judges at all levels has progressed with an alarming lack of bipartisan support, a
significant departure from the preceding 100 years (Dash, 2017). In President Trump’s first
nine months, his nominees to federal courts are thought to be both increasingly partisan and
younger, implying a lasting effect in the Judicial Branch (Klain, 2017).
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twice-weekly Justices’ conferences, the Justices collectively determine if the
case is to be adjudicated. If four or more Justices vote to hear the case, the
case is added to the Court’s docket for the term.10 Second, the Court hears
oral arguments in the case, which are open to the public and consist of each
party to the case making their argument before the Court. Oral arguments are
completed in the beginning of the term, while the last few months of the term
are dedicated solely to conference and opinion writing.
The third stage of any case is the convening of Justices in conference. As
is the tradition, Justices vote on cases they’ve heard on that Monday and
Tuesday at their Wednesday afternoon conference. Likewise, they vote on
cases they’ve heard on the preceding Wednesday at their Friday afternoon
conference. In order of seniority, each Justice is given the opportunity to
express their view on each case, after which votes are verbally cast in the same
order, with the most-senior Justice casting the first vote. A majority opinion
writer and dissenting opinion writer, if applicable, is immediately assigned by
the Chief Justice and highest-ranking Justice in the dissent (if applicable).11
When all opinions are written, the Justices meet in Conference for the
fourth and final stage of a case to finalize their collective vote.12 Case
decisions and opinions are typically delivered to the Court during the last
weeks of the term, in late June or early July. The fundamental privacy of all
conference deliberations and voting that implies the need to model
10 The votes of the Justices are taken privately, and the votes of the individual Justices
are never published (Fisher, 2015).
11 As majority opinions issued by the Supreme Court establish precedent, the reasons
for the Court’s decision are just as important as the decision itself. As such, concurring
opinions can also be offered—a written opinion of a judge that agrees with the majority, but
offers different or additional reasons as the basis for support.
12 Over the course of writing the opinions, the Justices continue to deliberate with
one another and see other cases. As the initial votes are never released to the public, it
is unclear how often Justices switch their votes in this stage. While understood to be
rare, the dissenting opinion has on occasion become the majority opinion as late as this
stage (see http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/
about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1).
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case-specific voting as having a spatial component, which we justify below.13
1.2.2 Literature
A large literature exist across economics, political science, and law in which
researchers have considered the determinants of SCOTUS voting. Within that
broad arena, some will see our modeling approach most closely matching what
is known as the “Attitudinal Model.” Advocates of this approach suggest that
not only do case characteristics influence how Justices vote, but the
interaction between Justice-specific characteristics (e.g., their individual
ideologies) and case characteristics also enter the Justices’ decision-making
process. For example, Justice characteristics are often found to be more
influential than legal characteristics of the case in determining Justices’
votes—Segal and Spaeth (2002) and Sunstein et al. (2006) interact “ideology”
with legal co-variates that are thought to capture the important determinants
of Justice votes (e.g., the extent of legal precedent). Moreover, Epstein and
Posner (2016) finds SCOTUS Justices more likely to side with the government
when the sitting President has appointed the Justice to the Court and
Caldeira et al. (1999) finds Justices deliberately vote with an eye for how it
will be seen given the anticipated outcome. Additionally, Hall (1992)
concludes that State Supreme Court Justices vote strategically to increase
their likelihood of reelection. Peppers and Zorn (2008) and Bonica et al.
(2017a) (using what is our preferred approach to measuring Justice Ideology at
13 The timing of the court’s ruling, as well as the publication of the ruling, is little
understood. Anecdotally, there is some evidence that Justices do not even begin deliberating
some cases until all oral arguments are completed for the term (Levy, 2015). There is also
evidence that the Court withholds from publishing certain rulings to ease the reporting
process (Palmer, 2013). Not only is there little evidence that the within-term timing of Court
decisions impacts Court rulings, the within-term timing is unobserved to the econometrician.
Lastly, it should be noted that in an act of profound symbolism, SCOTUS rules strictly
prohibit any photographs to be taken of the Court, with only two photographs of the Court’s
proceedings having ever been (illegally) published, the most recent of the two taken in 1937
(West, 2012).
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the SCOTUS level) find that law clerks influence Justices’ votes. Harmon et al.
(2019) also suggests peer effects are influential in legislative voting in the
European Parliament.14
The mapping of individual ideology to actual votes is complex, however,
even before considering potential codependencies. Fischman (2013) suggests
that the votes of Circuit Courts judges directly influence the votes of other
judges—while their institutional setting differs from ours, they also estimate
an instrumental-variables regression where colleagues’ characteristics are used
as instruments for colleagues’ votes. While they do control for case attributes,
our identification allows for the inclusion of case-specific fixed effects, which
absorbs any unobserved case-specific heterogeneity that could influence the
votes of multiple Justices—this will constitute our preferred specification.
Though not considering how interactions may depend on the political balance
of the court, Holden et al. (2019) considers the question of peer effects among
SCOTUS Justices, using Justice turnover and absences as identifying variation.
However, case-specific fixed effects again are not utilized in their specification.
We consider SCOTUS Justices and, in particular, how the potential
interactions and influences across Justices may depend on the party alignment
of the Supreme Court. In our analysis, we absorb any leaning of a particular
case (liberal or conservative, for example) into an estimated case-specific
parameter, so to not confound the relationship we identify across Justices
between the average vote on a particular case and the endogenous relationship
between votes on that case. In so doing, we also approach the problem with a
large degree of flexibility—we will run everything separately by term, for
14 The literature also includes results like Danziger et al. (2011) (showing that judges are
less likely to grant an individual parole the more time has passed since their last meal) and
Eren and Mocan (2018) (that judges tend to grant longer sentences to certain defendants
after the football team of their alma mater is defeated unexpectedly) and others (Cohen and
Yang, 2019; Spamann and Klöhn, 2016) suggest that care be taken in identifying judicial
behavior.
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example—but restrict identifying variation to strictly within-case variation.15
1.3 Empirical methods
Here, we discuss our empirical methodology and discuss the data used in
the analysis.
1.3.1 Model Specification
Even though Justice interactions occur within closed-door conference
negotiations and are therefore unobserved by the econometrician, they do
manifest in Justice votes. Given these votes, it is the implicit interactions that
occur in that data-generating process that we are interested in measuring.16
As it turns out, SCOTUS deliberations are precisely the sort of
data-generating process that the inclusion of a spatial-lag coefficient would
capture. This association is not always made explicit—Fischman (2013) does
not mention the spatial econometric literature, though it is very much in
keeping with the method—but there is an existing apparatus developed
around the intent of extracting such information. In fact, some of the
pioneering work is very much in keeping with the data-generating process of
the Supreme Court—Anselin (2003) describes the methodology’s value when
investigating strategic interactions, social norms, neighborhood and peer-group
effects, and how individual interactions can lead to emergent collective
behavior and aggregate patterns. In this way, our methodology follows
standard practice in the spatial-econometrics literature. Moreover, it
highlights the endogeneity problem somewhat more formally.
15 As will be made clear with the articulation of our specifications below, we include both
case- and justice-specific fixed effects, which leaves within-case variation in justice ideology
to identify the relationship between Justice votes. In so doing, we assume that Justice votes
are not influenced by the ideologies of other Justices on the Court in the same term, other
than through their votes.
16See Ladha (1995) for theoretical dissucssion of information sharing in group voting.
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By way of example, consider a Justice who hears arguments in conference
that are offered by other Justices. If the other Justices’ arguments have no
influence on her vote, on average, there should likewise be no explanatory
power in the observed votes of those others when we come to predict her
vote—that is, more generally, there should be no measurable dependency
between realized votes. In the notation of a typical “spatial-lag” model, there
is a parameter (typically notated ρ) that measures this dependency, as
captured by a spatial weighting matrix (typically notated as W ). If ρ̂ = 0,
there is evidence the relationship allowed for in W is not a determinant of her
votes, on average, as would be the case if Justice arguments were not
systematically informative to her. Of course, even if the vote of the Justice is
not influenced by the arguments of her peers, there may be correlation in the
observed votes of Justices due to shared unobservable case attributes. As we
discuss in detail below, we avoid this type of correlation from influencing our
estimate of ρ by instrumenting for the votes of her peers. If, on the other
hand, the arguments of other Justices did tend to influence her vote, then the
extent to which ρ̂ deviates from zero will be informative to the strength of
those underlying mechanisms within the observed data-generating process. We
do this, having absorbed any variation in realized votes that can be explained
by case- and Justice-specific parameters, and an error process itself.17 In
particular, we anticipate that within-party vote-dependency is highest when
17 Note that if all Justices are similarly persuaded by an argument, votes would collapse on
unanimity and a case-specific parameter would sufficiently capture that realization without
any need to appeal to a spatial process of vote dependency. Indeed, we might be inclined
to infer that there was something unobservable about that case that best explained the
unanimity, easily bypassing any appeal to “spatial dependencies” to explain such a tendency.
This is the sort of mechanism that we will unfortunately not be able to speak to—spatial
dependencies that are so strong that they collapse on unanimity can not identify the
“spatial-lag” coefficient. In this way, we might identify a lower-bound of the true relationship.
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the majority margin is thin.18
We now proceed to introduce additional formality in setting up the
empirical model. As we estimate the model separately for each term of the
Court (between 1969 and 1990), in no way do we restrict how these
relationships appear across terms, which will allow for interpreting any
changes in these interactions over time. Following standard notation, for each
term we model Justice j’s vote as
Vjc = κc + λj + βcIdeology j + ρ WVjc + εjc, (1)
where the elements of Vjc are {0, 1} and represent the votes of justices j on
cases c. We code Vjc = 1 if Justice j voted in the “liberal” direction on the
case. In explaining the variation in Vjc, we allow votes to have their own level
difference across cases, κc, capturing any case-specific characteristics that
might influence votes across Justices for a given case. (For example, were the
composition of cases influenced by the balance of the Court, level differences
in Republican or Democrat Justice’s inclinations would be captured in κc—the
average liberal/conservative leaning, in a way.) Similarly, we capture any
unobserved Justice-specific heterogeneity in λj, thereby absorbing any
tendency for individual Justices to vote in the liberal or conservative
directions, generally—to guard against any j-specific leanings inadvertently
identifying dependency. While Justice ideology is considered fixed within a
given term, and therefore captured in λj, we allow individual ideologies to
map into voting differently across cases, through βcIdeology j. Given our
identification strategy (below) this flexibility is what enables our estimation of
18 The dynamic also applies for Justices within the minority-party. If four Justices belong
to the minority-party and vote in the same direction, they are within one Justice of taking
the majority opinion. However, the smaller the minority, the farther from establishing
the majority position they will be, and the less significant will be the need to have strong
within-party vote dependency.
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ρ̂. We report standard-error estimates having allowed for clustering on cases.19
In Equation (1) we also include the spatial-lag itself, ρ WVjc, where ρ is
to be estimated, and reflects the degree to which the voting of other Justices
(where the “others” are captured in W ) explains Vjc. We consider two such
weighting matrices, in particular. First, we consider the potential relationship
between votes of Justices who were appointed to the Court by a president
with similar party affiliation. (We will notate this with the estimation of
ρParty.) Second, we consider the potential for Justice-specific ideologies to
form the basis for vote dependency—specifically, we will measure the extent to
which the voting behavior of the ideologically closest Justice who does not
share Justice j’s political party affiliation explains Justices j’s voting. (We will
notate this with the estimation of ρNO, where “NO” is read as “Nearest
Other.”)
As Equation (1) allows Vjc to depend on a weighted transformation of Vjc
itself, we follow Kelejian and Prucha (1998) in identifying ρ̂—we instrument
for WVjc with the W -weighted exogenous variables in Equation (1).
20 By
using the weighted exogenous variables to instrument for WVjc we predict the
average vote of j’s peer-justices (defined through W ) using the the average
ideology of that group interacted with case-specific fixed effects. This is
standard in the spatial econometrics literature, and simply amounts to
modeling the endogenous peer effect through an instrumental variable
technique, where the ideologies of other Justices (those serving in the same
term) are used as instruments for the votes of other Justices. It is in this that
we first see our eventual exclusion restriction—including both case- and
19 Robust standard errors are similar, as are those allowing for clustering on justice (which
accounts for correlation of votes across cases for given Justices, which would otherwise lead
to misleadingly small standard errors).
20 Following Kelejian and Prucha (1998), we also include W 2-weighted variables as
instruments in the first stage.
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justice-specific fixed effects, and still allowing for individual ideologies to
influence own voting, we assume that Justice votes are not influenced by the
ideologies of other Justices on the Court in the same term other than through
their votes. Put differently, we retrieve an estimate of the influence of peer
votes on own voting using information retrieved from estimating case-specific
relationships between peer ideology and peer voting, while controlling for the
general relationship between individual ideology and individual voting. We
therefore assume that the impact of colleagues is purely an endogenous effect,
since the instruments are invalid in the presence of contextual effects—justices
can only be influenced by their colleagues through their votes, and their
characteristics cannot have a direct impact. Following others (e.g., Harmon
et al. (2019), Fischman (2013), Chupp (2014)), we estimate linear probability
models in both first and second stages.21
Allowing for vote dependencies within party affiliated Justices
In considering the explanatory influence of party affiliated Justices, we
define the political party of the appointing president as Partyj ∈ {Democrat,
Republican}, with the elements wjk of the 9× 9 spatial-weight matrix W Party
defined wjk = 1 if Partyj = Partyk and j 6= k, and zero otherwise.
With λj absorbing across-Justice variation, κc absorbing across-case
variation, and βc Ideology j controlling for any relationship between individual
ideology and voting in case c, the identifying variation contributing to ρ̂ in our
baseline specific of Equation (1) is that originating from variation in the votes
(on the same case) of Justices who share the same Partyj. As our estimate of
WVjc is obtained from a regression that controls for both βc Ideology j and
βc W Ideology j (our instrument), our exclusion restriction is not that a
21 In Monte Carlo simulations, Beron and Vijverbeg (1999) finds that spatial linear-
probability models are close approximations of the true data-generating processes.
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justice’s own ideology (interacted with case-specific fixed effects) has no
influence on her vote. Rather, we must assume that the average ideology of
the other Justices in her party (interacted with case-specific fixed effects) only
influence her vote through their votes. Namely, we identify off of variation in
the predicted votes in a first-stage regression that uses the relationship
between voting and justice ideology on average... not actual peer-justice votes,
but what we would anticipate one’s peer-justice votes to be given the
relationship between the ideology of those peers and their case-specific votes.
Thus, while we would worry about identifying off of whatever causes actual
peer votes to deviate from what one might anticipate given the mapping of
ideology into voting, we have no such fear when instrumenting for actual votes
with predicted votes.
As is customary (see Anselin (1988) and following), we row-normalize the
weighting matrix (i.e., normalize weights to sum to one for each justice-case)
to prevent the introduction of variation that confounds the actual behavioral
response to other-Justice votes with the number of other Justices to which it is
possible to best respond. This normalization also allows us to retrieve
estimates of the response to the average affiliated Justice independently of
structure that will subsequently allow us to compare parameter estimates
across terms, as the number of party affiliated Justices changes.Though
inference statements adjust accordingly (from “in response to the average
Justice voting in the liberal direction” to “in response to one more Justice
voting in the liberal direction,” for example) results of the analysis are
qualitatively similar when we do not row-normalize the spatial weighting
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matrix. 22
As elements of W Party that correspond to {j, k}—pairings across party
lines are assigned a value of zero, ρ̂ reflects the responsiveness to the average
information exchanged between pairs of Justices of the same
Partyj—indicative of the votes of j’s party affiliated Justices having useful
information in predicting j’s vote.
With the inclusion of ρ in the estimation equation, we capture the
vote-determination process more flexibly than would an ρ = 0 restriction.
Specifically, ρ̂ captures the average best response between Justices j and those
Justices given weight in j’s vote through W—those with similar appointees in
this first case. For example, if ρ̂Party = 0.20 then the associated inference
statement would be that were all of j’s party affiliated Justices to move from a
vote of “zero” (i.e., the conservative position) to a vote of “one” (i.e., the
liberal position), the probability that Justice j would vote the liberal position
would increase by 0.20, or 20 percentage points. Below, we will find estimates
of ρParty as high as 0.75—this happens in the earliest years of our sample,
when the party affiliations of the Justices are most in balance. When the
Republican-affiliated majority is strongest, however, we retrieve estimates of
ρParty as low as -0.50, suggesting that a “conservative” vote from an affiliated
22 For example, if Justices 1, 2, and 3 (corresponding to the first three rows of W ) were
appointed by a Democratic president and Justices 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 were appointed by
a Republican president, as was the case between 1971 and 1974, the 9× 9 weight matrix,
WParty, can be defined as, for example
WParty1971 =

0 .5 .5 0 0 0 0 0 0
.5 0 .5 0 0 0 0 0 0
.5 .5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2
0 0 0 .2 0 .2 .2 .2 .2
0 0 0 .2 .2 0 .2 .2 .2
0 0 0 .2 .2 .2 0 .2 .2
0 0 0 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 .2
0 0 0 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 0

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Justice is associated with a lower probability that others sharing the same
party affiliation would vote in the conservative direction. The average (across
term) vote in our sample is in the conservative direction 51 percent of the
time. As such, a -0.5 to 0.75 swing is equivalent to -100 percent to 150 percent
of a standard deviation increase in the likelihood the Justice votes in the
conservative direction.
Allowing for vote dependencies between unaffiliated ideological
“neighbors”
Although a spatial dependence based on the partisanship of the
appointing president seems natural, it is possible other spatial dependencies
inform the votes of Supreme Court Justices. Specifically, in a second approach
to modeling the dynamics of Justice votes, we consider looking to the
ideologically like-minded Justices who do not share a party affiliation. This
follows from our intuition, that votes of those closest in some ideological space
but “across the aisle” may have explanatory power in predicting Justice j’s
vote.
In an alternative weight matrix, then, we allow j’s vote to be influenced
by k’s vote (i.e., wjk = 1), when k is the closest to j in ideology among all
available k that satisfy Partyj 6= Partyk. We notate this “nearest-other”
weighting matrix as WNO. Under such a weighting rule, ρ̂NO = 0.2 would
imply that, on average, when the oppositely-appointed Justice closest to j’s
ideology switches their vote from the conservative to the liberal direction, the
likelihood Justice j votes in the liberal direction increases by 20 percentage
points.
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1.3.2 Data
Justice votes
The voting data we use in our analysis originates from the Supreme
Court Database–Justice Centered Data, managed by Washington University
Law School (Spaeth et al., 2017). We consider the terms of the Supreme Court
from 1969 through 1990. The dataset contains information at the
justice-by-case level.23 The specific variable of interest is each justice’s
case-specific vote, which is classified as either being the “liberal” or
“conservative” position on the matter. Spaeth et al. (2017) classifies each vote
in this manner using an extensive hierarchical rubric, determined
independently of how each specific Justice voted.24 For example, if a Justice
votes in a “pro-injured person” direction for a case on unions or economic
activity, or the “pro-female” direction in cases regarding abortion, the vote is
classified as liberal.25
Justice ideology
With respect to the measurement of Justice ideology, we adopt the index
developed in Bonica et al. (2017b), which stands as one of the few measures of
ideology that is independent of contemporaneous vote decisions, maintaining
identification and mitigating the concern one would have over introducing
23 While SCOTUS primarily functions as an appellate court, it has had original jurisdiction
roughly 200 times since its founding in 1789. We exclude all cases in which SCOTUS has
original jurisdiction as the votes in these cases are not classified as “liberal” or “conservative.”
24 That is, Justice votes cannot influence the classification of a vote direction as “liberal”
or “conservative”. Though, Harvey and Woodruff (2011) do suggest that there may be a
small amount of confirmation bias in determining the case-type category for certain cases.
We do not worry that this plays an important role in our analysis, and anticipate that any
such bias would be absorbed into case and/or Justice fixed effects. We do redefine Vjc to
capture Justice j voting to reverse the ruling on case c, and our results are both qualitatively
(and even “quantitatively”) unchanged.
25 The measurement of political direction of each case has been extensively utilized within
the field. For example, see Katz et al. (2017).
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endogenous measures of ideology into our modeling of voting (Bailey, 2007;
Martin and Quinn, 2002).26 Fundamentally, this index is based on the
political-campaign contributions of Justices’ law clerks, yielding “Clerk-Based
Ideology” (CBI) scores for each SCOTUS justice.27 Each Justice in our sample
has a fixed CBI score. Due to data limitations, Bonica et al. (2017b) does not
calculate CBI scores for all Justices present in terms prior to 1969, thus
limiting our analysis to the 1969, and later, terms.28
Sample restrictions
We estimate Equation (1) separately for all SCOTUS terms between 1969
and 1990. Recall that we consider dependencies both within party (W Party)
and between ideological neighbors (WNO). Our considerations of potential
vote dependencies are therefore limited to the number of terms for which there
is informative variation. For example, we cannot estimate Equation (1)
between 1991 and 1993, as the structure of the Court includes only a single
Democrat-appointed Justice on the bench—there is no within-party variation.
26 For additional detail, see Bailey (2017).
27 CBI scores are calculated by averaging the CFScores, a measurement of ideology based
off of political contributions, of all individuals who clerked for a given justice. See Bonica
(2014) for the development of CFScores, and Bonica et al. (17su) for their application to law
clerks. As a Justice’s ideology correlates positively with that of their law clerks (Liptak, 2010;
Nelson et al., 2009), the political donations of law clerks arguably predict but are exogenous
to Justice ideology. While it is possible that Justice votes influence the political contributions
of future clerks (e.g., potential clerks may donate to certain candidates to increase the
likelihood they will be awarded a clerkship), Bonica (2014), Bonica et al. (17su), and Bonica
et al. (2015) find no evidence that individuals contribute to candidates strategically.
28 Segal and Cover (1989) develops an alternative measures of Justice ideology. However,
these measures are intended to capture attitudes towards civil liberties, as opposed to overall
ideology, and vary in informativeness, dependent on the appointing President. See Epstein
and Mershon (1996) and Segal, Epstein, Cameron, and Spaeth (1995) for discussion of these
and other limitations. Nonetheless, when the analysis is completed using these measurements
of ideology, results (not reported) are qualitatively similar. Epstein et al. (2007) also develops
a partially exogenous measure of Justice ideology, informed by Justice votes in their first
year on the court. It is time-invariant and could be used for our analysis, but we should
then also discard the six terms over our sample in which there is a first-term Justice. This
measure also weighs the political ideology of the appointing president directly, introducing
common factors across Justices, which would further confound inference. For these reasons,
we do not adopt this measure.
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However, once the court returns to having two democrats in 1994, Equation
(1) can not be estimated with WNO, as all Republican-appointed Justices
share the nearest Democrat-appointed Justice and each Democrat-appointed
Justice shares the nearest Republican-appointed justice. Moreover, after 2009
(and evident in Figure 1), the structure of the Court leaves no overlap in
Justice ideology across party affiliation. That is, the least-liberal
Democrat-appointed Justice is more liberal than the most-liberal
Republican-appointed justice, leaving no variation among Republican
(Democrat) Justices in their differently affiliated nearest ideological neighbor.
We also discard observations under three conditions. First, if fewer than
nine justice’s vote on a given case, it introduces a case-specific (c-specific)
dimensionality to the weight matrix and identifying variation that is then also
potentially endogenous. We therefore discard all such cases (861 out of 3,542)
and the associated votes on the cases (7,534 of 31,663).29 Second, we give
special attention to the 1975 term, the term in which Justice Douglas retired
after participating in only six cases. Instead of losing the information for the
entire term, we model 1975 after discarding these first six cases and the 12
that cleared the Court’s docket before the appointment of Justice Stevens.
Last, in approximately two percent (602) of the remaining votes, the
classification of votes as either “liberal” or “conservative” is indeterminable.30
So to not impose this indeterminacy on related votes, we discard all (149)
cases for which there is any Justice vote that is not classifiable as “liberal” or
“conservative.”
Other than the 1969 term, after the sample restrictions are applied, the
29 In particular, note that only eight Justices were on the bench for the majority of the
1969 term. Despite the small sample size, and thus imprecise point estimates, the information
in the term provides insight into possible spatial dependencies.
30 For example, if in a justice’s opinion for the case, whether the opinion is in the majority,
dissent, or concurrence, she sides with both liberal and conservative points of view, as defined
by the Spaeth et al. (2017) rubric, the direction of the Justices’ vote is undefined.
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fewest number of cases heard was 62 (in 1987) and the highest number of cases
heard was 153 (in 1972). As the Supreme Court saw fewer cases over time
during the terms in our sample (Moffett et al., 2016), there is a corresponding
decline in the number of cases in our sample each term.
Descriptive Statistics
In Table 1, given the structure of the Court—the number of Republican
and Democrat appointees over time—we report the fractions of times the
various party specific majorities were realized. For example, of the five
Republican-appointed Justices on the Court in 1970, in 54 percent of cases
they voted together (i.e., a majority of five), in 27 percent of cases they voted
four-to-one, and in 19 percent of cases they voted three-to-two.
Across all terms with seven Republican-appointed justices (1975-1990
and 1994-2008), on average, 21.2 percent of cases were ruled with the
Republican-appointed justices divided by one vote (i.e., four-three) and across
all terms with five Republican-appointed justices (1969 to 1970 and 2010 to
2014), the average percent of cases in which the Republican appointed justices
were divided by one vote (three-two) is 13.1 percent. Similarly, in terms with
two Democrat-appointed justices (1975 to 1990 and 1994 to 2008), the two
Democrats voted in the same direction on average in 64.4 percent of cases,
while in terms with four Democrat appointed justices (1969 to 1970 and 2009
to 2014), the four Democrats voted in the same direction on average in 75.0
percent of cases. We also show the percent of votes cast each term that were
in the “conservative” direction. While there is variation across terms, there is
no clear link between the average percent of votes in the “conservative”
direction and the number of republicans on the court.
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Table 1: Party Line Voting on the Supreme Court, 1969-2014
Percent voting with the party majority
Republican Democrat
Number “Conservative”
in majority = 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 votes (percent)
1969 0 17 83 0 17 83 70
1970 19 27 54 19 39 42 50
1971 8 26 18 48 42 58 46
1972 9 24 26 41 54 45 49
1973 6 18 34 42 45 55 48
1974 7 20 27 45 46 55 43
1975 18 22 20 40 33 67 49
1976 18 21 21 39 33 67 58
1977 21 33 14 31 27 73 48
1978 23 23 20 34 28 73 55
1979 24 27 20 29 38 62 47
1980 20 22 23 34 37 63 53
1981 26 20 16 38 33 67 53
1982 22 18 15 45 34 66 51
1983 20 18 17 45 34 66 53
1984 23 18 20 40 38 63 52
1985 29 22 14 35 44 56 54
1986 36 24 9 31 51 49 48
1987 27 15 11 47 32 68 48
1988 29 19 10 41 46 54 52
1989 33 17 13 37 46 54 50
1990 20 21 17 41 36 64 46
1991 8 22 24 8 38 100 49
1992 8 15 18 12 47 100 48
1993 5 19 24 9 43 100 53
1994 22 18 18 42 11 89 57
1995 15 17 23 44 17 83 52
1996 16 14 18 52 10 90 58
1997 16 16 17 52 13 88 56
1998 12 23 27 39 17 83 58
1999 16 27 17 41 18 82 45
2000 18 22 10 50 7 93 49
2001 25 25 9 42 9 91 60
2002 19 23 12 45 13 87 59
2003 21 21 10 49 8 92 56
2004 23 28 10 38 12 88 47
2005 13 28 8 51 23 77 50
2006 18 27 15 40 12 88 55
2008 19 33 10 39 21 79 54
2009 4 20 27 49 19 81 46
2010 6 24 71 6 16 78 56
2011 10 19 71 6 28 67 55
2012 16 16 67 3 12 85 50
2013 16 6 78 4 6 83 45
2014 25 24 51 1 12 87 46
Notes: For each term-party pairing, the value indicates the percent of cases in which were ruled by a
within-party majority of the given number. For example, of the five Republican-appointed Justices on
the Court in 1970, in 54 percent of cases they voted together (i.e., a majority of five), in 27 percent of
cases they voted four-to-one, and in 19 percent of cases they voted three-to-two. For each term, we also
report the percent of votes that were in the “conservative” direction.
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1.4 Results
We estimate the models represented in Equation (1) separately for each
year of data, for SCOTUS terms 1969 through 1990. In Section 1.4.1 we allow
for vote dependencies between Justices of whom were appointed to the Court
by Presidents of the same party and in Section 1.4.2 we allow for vote
dependencies between ideologically similar Justices whom were appointed to
the Court by Presidents of different parties. Recall, across the sample, there
are three distinct structural compositions of the court. In 1969 and 1970, the
Court was populated with five Republican-appointed Justices and four
Democrat-appointed Justices—this is the strongest a priori voting block the
Republican-appointed Justices will see in the time series. Between 1971 and
1974, the Court was populated with six Republican-appointed Justices and
three Democrat-appointed Justices, and between 1975 and 1990, the Court
was populated with seven Republican-appointed Justices and two
Democrat-appointed Justices.
As an ideologically based ρ̂Party (i.e., based on WNO) is only estimable
through 1990, we report on the analyses of party and ideology together in
Figure 2 from 1969 through 1990. We discuss the post-1990 behavior
separately in Section 1.4.3.
1.4.1 Are there evident relationships in the votes of party
affiliated Justices?
In Panel A of Figure 2 we plot separate estimates of ρ̂Party over time,
with 95-percent confidence intervals. With no restrictions on the estimates
across terms, the structural breaks in the composition of the Court are evident
in the estimated ρ̂Party, one occurring between the 1970 and 1971 terms and
one occurring between the 1974 and 1975 terms. As the Court becomes more
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imbalanced in terms of the party of the appointing presidents, the measurable
vote dependency within party affiliated Justices declines. Point estimates of
ρParty in 1970 and 1971, and in 1974 and 1975, are statically different from
each other at the 1-percent level, while no other term-consecutive estimates of
ρParty are statistically different from each other, even at the 10-percent level.
This is consistent with more internal pressure (or bargaining) for Justices to
vote in the same direction when the margins are thin—when the potential
consequence of party affiliated Justices splitting their votes are higher. Note,
in particular, that no discontinuities are evident around within-party changes
in the Court’s justices—same-party Justice turnover occurred in 1980-1981,
1985-1986, 1986-1987, and 1989-1990—consistent with our results being driven
by the structural makeup of the Court relating to party affiliation.31
While the differences in ρ̂Party between 1970-to-1971 and 1974-to-1975
are striking, it is possible that they are not a result of changes in the
partisan-divide of the court and instead reflecting other changes. If SCOTUS
cases vary systematically with changes in the partisan-divide of the court, for
example, the parameter estimates reflect both the relationship between the
partisan-divide and voting behavior of Justices and the selection of cases. In
Figure 3 we explore this possibility.
In Panel A of Figure 3 we report the percent of cases in which the lower
court’s ruling was in the liberal direction. Importantly, we restrict the sample
31 The negative estimates of ρParty in the late 1980s deserve note. Throughout much of
the 1980s, only two Democrat-appointed Justices (i.e., Justice White and Justice Marshall)
sat on the bench. Mechanically, each vote cast by Justice White and Justice Marshall in
this time span receives six times the weight of the average republican vote in the estimation
of ρParty, as the total effect of six Republican-appointed Justices’ votes on the remaining
Republican-appointed Justice is normalized to one. While this does not inherently lead
to a reduction in ρ̂Party, Justice White and Justice Marshall happened to have voted in
opposite directions somewhat regularly—increasingly so in the late 1980s. For example, as
suggested in Table 1, between 1975 and 1984 (when ρ̂Party is not statistically different from
zero), the two Democrat-appointed Justices voted in the same direction in 48 percent of
non-unanimous cases. Yet, between 1985 and 1990, they voted in the same direction in only
33 percent of non-unanimous cases.
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Figure 2: Measurable voting dependencies of Justice votes and the structure of
the Supreme Court, 1969–1990
(a) Does within-party vote dependency change with how secure the party vote is?
(b) Does vote dependency among ideologically similar Justices change
with how secure the party vote is?
Notes: Each estimate of ρ̂ is derived from a separate model. The weighting matrices
in Panel A, WParty allows for the votes of a Justice to vary with the votes of all
other Justices who were appointed to the Court by a president of the same party. For
example, ρ̂Party = 0.2 would imply that if one Justice in Justice j’s party changed
their vote from the conservative to the liberal direction, the likelihood Justice j
would vote in the liberal direction increases by 20 percentage points. The weighting
matrices in Panel B, WNO allows for the votes of a Justice to vary with the votes of
the Justice who is closest in ideology, but affiliated with the other party. Confidence
intervals (95%) are derived from errors which are allowed to cluster by case.
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of cases to those SCOTUS cases that identify ρ̂Party—namely, cases with
non-unanimous SCOTUS votes. While the percent of cases that were ruled in
a liberal direction by the lower Court is a somewhat noisy process, no
systematic variation appears and there is clearly no pattern coincident with
structural changes to the party affiliations surrounding the 1970-to-1971 and
1974-to-1975 terms. In Panel B of Figure 3 we report the percent of (ρ̂Party
identifying) cases in which the lower court had disagreement in their
ruling—that is, the percent of lower court rulings that were not unanimous.
While a slight increase seems to occur over time, there is again an absence of
shape that could be consistent with the structural changes in the court. In
Panel C of Figure 3 we report the percent of (ρ̂ identifying) cases originating
from the Ninth Circuit Court, often believed to be the most liberal Circuit.
Again, there is no indication of changes aligning with the structural changes in
the court. Last, we re-estimate Equation (1) with the exclusion of the spatial
lag (i.e., dropping the spatial component, or estimating Equation (1) with the
restriction that ρParty = 0). In Panel D of Figure 3 we report the
mean-squared error for each of these specifications, which steadily declines in a
way that is consistent with the remaining covariates better capturing the
decision-making process over time.32 Importantly, there are no discontinuities
in the MSEs across the structural divides of the court.
1.4.2 Has ideology replaced partisanship in voting?
In Panel B of Figure 2 we report the results of having re-estimated
Equation (1), but with a weighting matrix that reflects ideology. Specifically,
ideology that informs voting from “across the aisle,” as we capture in
32 This suggests that variation across Justices on ideology has itself played a more
important role in explaining variation in voting over the twenty-year period we consider. This
corroborates a rich literature that suggests that the Court has become increasing ideologically
focused (Nelson et al., 2009; Landes and Posner, 2009).
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Figure 3: Are there potential confounders that move similarly with the Court’s
structure?
(a) Are there similar discontinuities in the
ideology of lower-court decisions?
(b) Are there similar discontinuities in the
unanimity of lower-court decisions?
(c) Are there similar discontinuities in the
share of cases originating in the 9th Circuit
Court?
(d) Are other (non-spatial) covariates ex-
plaining votes differently?
Notes: In Panels (a), (b), and (c), each percentage point displays the percent of cases
seen by SCOTUS in a term in which the lower court issued a liberal ruling, was
unanimous, and was on appeal from the Ninth Circuit (often thought of as the most
liberal Circuit), respectively, taken from the subset of cases in which SCOTUS’s
ruling was divided. In Panel (d), each point displays the mean squared error from
a term-specific OLS regression of justice-level fixed effects, case-level fixed effects,
and Justice ideology, which is allowed to interact with each case independently, on
Justice vote. No spatial dependencies are allowed. In all Panels, values for the 1969
term are excluded due to the small number of observations.
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W = WNO.33
Interestingly, as the Court itself becomes more imbalanced with respect
to party affiliation (and the measurable within-party vote dependencies
decline), seemingly in accord with these structural changes, the influence of
ideologically-similar Justices of different party affiliation... increases. While
the step-function is somewhat less pronounced in ρ̂NO (in Panel B) than it is
in ρ̂Party (in Panel A), the pattern is evident, suggesting that these two
processes together tell an important story of how partisan and ideological
dependencies move together.
There is an upward trend in ρ̂NO in the period following the seven-two
imbalance of the Court, which one could interpret as an eventual learning of
sorts. One possible interpretation is that less dependency within party
affiliated Justices (Figure 2, Panel A) allows Justices to weigh other sources of
information in order to assist in their decision-making, and the views of
likeminded “others” gradually takes on an importance of sorts. As
Justice-specific ideology is controlled for, the results suggest that Justices’
votes were positively influenced by the vote of their “other” in a way that is
consistent with a discarding of the partisan-divided Courts of the early 1970s
(when Partyj-type bargaining was highly influential), suggestive of the rise of
an ideologically-guided court.
33 In the first stage of the 2SLS approach we estimate the spatial lag of Vjc weighted
by WNO, using weighted versions of βcIdeologyj . As W
NO is a nearest-neighbor weighting
matrix that conditions on neighbors j and k being appointed by presidents of different
parties, Ideologyj and Ideologyk are highly correlated. Thus, as βcIdeologyj is included
in the first stage to predict WVjc, there is little variation in WVjc for the instruments
βcIdeologyk to explain. The first-stage F -statistic is on the small side. However, we do not
interpret this as indicative of βcIdeologyk being irrelevant instruments, but that βcIdeologyk
are highly correlated with the included exogenous parameters—specifically, with βcIdeologyk.
Nonetheless, the results are suggestive.
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1.4.3 The post-1990 Court
In 1991, Justice Marshall (a Democratic appointee) retired and was
succeeded by Justice Thomas, who was appointed to the bench by a
Republican, leaving just one Democrat appointed Justice on the Court. This
defines the end of the set of terms for which a parameter on W = WNO is
estimable, given the singular Democrat appointee. The eight-one divide
continued until the 1994 term, when Justice Blackmun (a Republican
appointee) replaced with the Democrat appointee Justice Breyer. This
seven-two split continued through 2008, followed by a single term of six-three
split, and five-four split thereafter.
This development provides an opportunity to examine a new set of
transition periods and observe if the strength of dependency of within party
affiliated Justice votes increased as the Court’s party divide returned to a
more-equal division. In Figure 4 we report the estimated spatial-lag
coefficients associated with within-party vote dependency (W = W Party). We
do so separately for terms 1994 through 2014.34
While the estimate of ρParty does not change in a statistically significant
manner with the Court’s transitions from a seven-two (2008) or to six-three
(2009), there is a large and statistically significant increase in ρ̂Party as the
Court transitions from six-three back to five-four (2010). The estimate of
34 Recall, the single Democrat-appointed Justice in 1991 through 1993 precludes the
estimation of both ρParty and ρNO, while the political political polarization after 1990
prohibits the estimation of ρNO for all subsequent years. Additionally, as Justice Scalia was
only present for 18 cases in the 2015 term before passing away, we do not report analysis for
the 2015 term, as only eight Justices were present on the Court. Moreover, regarding the
2015 term, Justice Elena Kagan remarked that “[The Court] didn’t want to look as though
[it] couldn’t do [it’s] job. ... And so we worked very, very hard to reach consensus and to
find ways to agree that might not have been very obvious” (Biskupic, 2018). As such, the
data-generating process in 2015 seems somewhat unique, a priori, as Justices not only cared
about the case outcome, but specifically the makeup of the Justices’ votes. (While tied votes
are possible with eight Justices, it appears Justices actively avoided such outcomes in an
attempt to uphold the integrity of the Court.)
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Figure 4: Measurable party dependencies in Justice
votes and the structure of the Supreme Court, 1994–
2014
Notes: Each estimate of ρ̂ is derived from a separate
model. In each, the weighting matrix, WParty allows for
the votes of a Justice to vary with the votes of all other
Justices who were appointed to the Court by a president of
the same party. Confidence intervals (95%) are derived
from errors which are allowed to cluster by case.
ρParty in 2010 (.53), which is the first year the Court returns to a five-four
Republican Court, is moderately smaller than the estimates we retrieve for
1969 (.78) and 1970 (.77), the most-recent terms in which the Court was
similarly structured. If anything, this suggests that the dependency between
party affiliated Justices has weakened over time. The quick convergence of
ρ̂Party to zero further suggests that any dependency has lost importance in
recent years, despite a priori balance returning, which is consistent with our
finding that vote dependencies began to take on more of an ideological focus
in the 1980s.
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1.5 Conclusion
As the final arbiter of US law, the Supreme Court is charged with
ensuring the American people the promise of equal Justice under law and,
thereby, functions as guardian and interpreter of the Constitution. Given the
importance, it is surprising to find that our understanding of how Justices of
the Court function is relatively unexplored.
In this paper we examine the voting behavior of Supreme Court Justices
in a way that also estimates potential co-dependencies in the votes of the
Justices. Doing so, we identify causal relationships in the voting of Justices
who share party affiliation (i.e., those having been appointed by Presidents of
the same political party)—not merely level shifts in the conservativeness or
liberalness of votes, which we absorb in Justice fixed effects each term and
case-specific parameters, but measurable dependency that goes beyond any
average inclinations of the Court.
Sharp discontinuities in these dependencies are evident, and are clearly
coincident with changes in the party imbalance of the Court over time.
Specifically, we find that in terms of larger imbalance—terms when the
Republican-affiliated Justices outnumber Democrat-appointed Justices by a
larger number—measurable co-dependencies between party affiliated Justices
are attenuated. We also identify a larger role for information sharing among
ideological neighbors in these terms. Interestingly, we find no similar pattern
around the turnover of Justices that do not trigger a change in the balance of
the Court, further suggesting that we have identified a mechanism through
which the party imbalance of the Court operates.
Overall, voting patterns suggest a tradeoff—a tradeoff between political
affiliation and ideology, with more-equal party representation on the Court
encouraging greater party awareness in Justice voting, and less-equal party
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representation allowing those across party lines but with similar ideologies to
inform each other’s votes. As the polarization of today’s Court inhibits
researchers from separately identifying the roles of party affiliation and
ideology, it seems party related dependencies, even as the
Republican-Democrat imbalance has subsided, have not returned, which we
see as a topic of future research.
Moreover, while the periodic changes in the structure of the Supreme
Court allows for a unique opportunity to consider the roles of affiliation and
individual ideologies, we see an intuition here that may inform other empirical
applications—those more-complex and less able to allow for the identification
of causal relationships. Though individual votes or actions are not always
observable—the Supreme Court offers something of a unique opportunity in
that dimension, since individual votes are recorded—such tensions may well be
anticipated in decision-making environments more broadly, and inform the
makeup of committees and decision-making authorities generally.
While my first chapter of my dissertation explores the voting behavior of
Justices of the Supreme Court, I now turn my attention towards the
decision-making behavior of judges within the criminal sector of the judicial
branch. Both voting and criminal sentencing, the focus of my second and third
chapter, are a like in crucial ways, as they both are activities which should be
determined by relevant attributes of the setting at hand. However, in my
second and third chapter, I again find unexpected characteristics often are
influential in judges’ decision making processes.
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CHAPTER II
RACE, FAIRNESS, AND CO-DETERMINATION IN CRIMINAL
SENTENCING: EVIDENCE FROM SENTENCING COHORTS IN
PENNSYLVANIA
2.1 Introduction
Judges are believed to be legal experts and are, in turn, given great
discretion in their sentencing decisions in criminal trials. While what
information specifically should or should not influence a judge’s discretion is a
matter of opinion, it is generally assumed such information should not be
arbitrary to the defendant in question. However, judges typically do not
sentence one defendant a day, which poses a challenge to the implicit
assumption that judges’ decisions are independent across defendants. In fact,
sentencing multiple defendants on the same day may inadvertently increase
the possibility of other-defendant-specific factors (that are arbitrary to the
defendant in question) impacting a judge’s sentencing-determination processes,
and ultimately leading to a defendant receiving an unjustified sentence.35
In this research, I utilize the fact that trial judges preside over multiple
cases at once and sentence numerous defendants on the same day (creating
what I define as a “sentencing cohort”) to estimate dependencies between the
sentences of different defendants. As judges receive information about
defendants’ cases concurrently, it is natural to believe judges may determine
the sentencing outcomes of multiple defendants’ cases simultaneously and even
35 While this research is focused on judicial decision-making, as opposed to the prosecutorial
decision-making, the findings of the paper can be abstracted away from the judge and simply
be thought of as analysis of the actions of sentencing decision-makers, whomever they may
be.
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co-dependently.36 A breadth of related literature exists within economics,
political science, and law that examines what information judges use in
sentencing, but it has largely focused on examining which types of
characteristics, either of the judge (e.g., sex), the case (e.g., crime type), the
defendant (e.g., race), or the state of the world (e.g., weather), influence
sentencing outcomes for any given defendant. The literature has yet to fully
examine an important aspect of the sentencing procedure: whether judges’
sentencing decisions are independent across defendants.
I find that being sentenced alongside (same judge, same day) defendants
with one-year longer average sentences leads to four-day increases in a
defendant’s sentence. As my estimate allows individual sentences to influence
the sentences of multiple other defendants in the same sentencing cohort,
cumulative effects stemming from an individual sentence can create large
variation in the sentences of others. My estimate controls for endogeneity
between sentences and potential sorting of defendants (either on observables or
unobservables) into sentencing cohorts by using the average predicted sentence
of other defendants in a sentencing cohort based on observable characteristics
of the other defendants and their cases, rather than their observed average
sentence. As such, my empirical specification does not rely on an assumption
of random assignment of cases to judges, or random assignments of cases to
sentencing days. In racial-heterogeneity analysis, I find that while the
sentences of both black and white defendants are positively determined by the
average sentence of defendants of the same-race in their sentencing cohort,
neither are determined by the average sentence of defendants of the other-race
in their sentencing cohort.
The results expand on the previous literature by shedding light on a new
36 In fact, in an experimental setting with hypothetical cases, Rachlinski et al. (2015) finds
awarded sentence lengths to be influenced by previous cases “sentenced” that day.
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channel that affects judges sentencing decisions: sentence-to-sentence effects.
The existence of inter-defendant effects in judicial sentencing suggests
defendants receive shorter or longer sentences simply by chance with respect
to the other defendants in their sentencing cohort. In addition to the moral
implications of unjustified sentence lengths, as sentence length may have
profound economic ramifications for defendants’ futures (Aizer and Doyle,
2015; Mueller-Smith, 2015), any elements of judges’ sentencing decisions which
are not based on the defendants’ alleged activity should be eliminated.37
Moreover, the same-race versus other-race heterogeneity suggests judges are
behaving in differing manners based on the racial-composition of the
defendants seen on a particular day, potentially adding to overall racial
discrepancies in sentencing.
In Section 2.2, I summarize relevant literature and review the
institutional processes of sentencing within Pennsylvania, the setting of my
empirical research. In Section 2.3, I describe the estimated equation and
provide summary statistics of the data. In Section 2.4, I present baseline
results and a variety of heterogeneity analyses. In Section 2.5, I present results
of robustness exercises and in Section 2.6, I conclude.
2.2 Background
Here, I briefly describe the relevant literature and provide institutional
knowledge as context for the empirical application.
37 Note, the literature is evolving and mixed on the long-run effects of incarceration. See
e.g., Bhuller et al. (2019), Rose and Shem-Tov (2019), Landerø (2015), Green and Winik
(2010), and Kling (2006) for varying results.
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2.2.1 Literature
It is well established that defendants receive differentiated sentences
based on their demographic profile; being black or male and having low
income or educational status have all been shown to increase the severity of
defendants’ sentences (see, e.g. Mustard (2001); Steffensmeier et al. (2006);
Steen et al. (2005)).38 In addition, many judge-specific attributes have also
been found to be an important part of the sentencing procedure. For example,
judge race (Steffensmeier and Britt, 2002), political partisanship (Cohen and
Yang, 2019; Schanzenbach, 2015), and family structure (Glynn and Sen, 2015)
all have been shown to influence sentencing behavior.39
Extra-legal influences have also been shown to dramatically affect judges’
sentencing decisions. For example, Eren and Mocan (2018) find judges assign
harsher sentences to black defendants after unexpected football loses the week
before and Chen et al. (2016) and Heyes and Saberian (2019) find the results
of baseball games and the temperature on the day of sentencing affect
sentencing outcomes. In an experimental setting with legal experts, Englich
et al. (2006) finds (literally) random information presented to legal experts
influences recommended sentences length, even when the legal expert knows
the information is generated at random. As it is clear judges use
non-defendant-specific information in their decision making processes, it raises
the question as to whether they also use different-defendant-specific
38 Alesina and Ferrara (2014) additionally shows patterns of racism when looking at
sentencing appeals. Moreover, Blair et al. (2004) and Eberhardt et al. (2006) show that when
comparing defendants of the same race, defendants that have more Afrocentric facial features
receive harsher sentences. However, the presence of differentiating sentencing outcomes
among defendants of varying demographics does not itself prove judges act in an unfounded
“racist” manner; Park (2017) fails to reject the null hypothesis that judges solely use statistical
discrimination, as opposed to taste-based discrimination.
39 Note, other research has found judge race and political partisanship to not influence
judicial decision making (see, e.g. Lim et al. (2016)) or do so in more nuanced ways (see,
e.g. ?), and judge gender has often been shown to not impact sentencing outcomes (see, e.g.
Gruhl et al. (1981)).
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information in their processes.
2.2.2 Pennsylvania Criminal Sentencing
In most settings, including Pennsylvania, there are official limits to which
judges must adhere during sentencing. The guidelines are extensive and have
two crucial benchmarks: maximum and minimum limits to the punishment.40
These limits provide a range of potential outcomes, and judges are required to
use their discretion on a case-by-case basis to determine the specific sentence
for each defendant. In addition to legally binding limits, judges are also
provided with non-binding sentencing guidelines which are intended to serve
as benchmarks in sentencing across defendants.
Trial judges are required to sentence defendants shortly after a defendant
has been found guilty of their accused crime.41 Sentences can include a wide
variety of penalties, with fines, probation, and incarceration time being among
the most common. If incarceration time is assigned, both a maximum and
minimum sentence must be given. Judges have wide discretion in their
sentencing behavior, but are encouraged to use set guidelines in their
decision-making. Sentencing guidelines are produced by the Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing, which was established in 1978 with the intent to
standardize sentencing practices within the state.42 Sentencing guidelines are
largely based off of the seriousness of the offense (quantified as an “Offense
Gravity Score”) and the defendant’s criminal history (quantified as a “Prior
Record Score”).
40 For example, in Pennsylvania, a defendant found guilty of identity theft can not be
sentenced to more than 10 years in prison.
41 The average defendant is sentenced 335 days after their date of offense, with fewer than
1% of defendants sentenced within a month of their date of offense.
42 There are mixed results as to whether the guidelines have succeeded in their goal (Black-
well et al., 2008; Gorton and Boies, 1999), and some believe they may actively increase racial
disparities in sentencing (Wykstra, 2018)
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In the majority of instances, judges reveal the sentences of multiple
defendants on a single day-of-sentencing (DOS). This occurs largely for
practical reasons in an attempt to maximize the efficiency of judges’ time, as
judges may be sentencing cases while at the same time presiding over other
cases. Often, the specific cases of defendants sentenced on the same day share
no connections; it is simply a matter of chance the defendants are sentenced
on the same day. However, as discussed in Section 2.3.1, my empirical analysis
does not rely on the random assignment of cases to specific days-of-sentencing
(nor the random assignment of cases to judges).
2.3 Empirical Analysis
Judges may determine defendants’ sentences co-dependently, both before
the days-of-sentencing while judges weigh their options, and on
days-of-sentencing themselves when judges announce the sentences to the
defendants. While controlling for standard case-, judge-, and
defendant-specific attributes, I allow the sentences of other defendants to
influence judges’ sentencing decisions. Specifically, my model specification
allows the mean sentence length of other defendants in defendants’ sentencing
cohorts to have a direct impact on their sentences. I define this variable as
“Mean-Other-Sentence.”
The predicted sign of the coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence in a
regression of Sentence on Mean-Other-Sentence is theoretically ambiguous.
For instance, if defendants share a sentencing cohort with someone found
guilty of murder (which would lead to a large value of Mean-Other-Sentence),
judges may reduce the other defendants’ sentences because they do not want
to award high sentences to everyone. However, it is equally plausible that
judges may extend the other defendants’ sentences as assigning a high
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sentence to the defendant found guilty of murder has temporarily made judges
“tough-on-crime” for all defendants. Alternatively, if judges sentence defendants
independently, the coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence should be zero.
2.3.1 Model Specification
To account for the endogenous nature of co-dependencies, my empirical
specification follows a straight-forward two-stage approach and takes caution
from the warnings put forth in Angrist (2014) on how to empirically estimate
peer effects. First, I use a variety of observable characteristics to obtain a
predicted value of each defendant’s sentence using 10-fold cross validation.43
Equation 2 describes the estimated equation,
Sentenceijt = δj + δy + β1Crimei + β2DOSjt + β3Defendanti + εijt (2)
where Sentenceijt represents the awarded maximum sentence for defendant i,
sentenced by judge j on day t (in year y).44 I control for the average sentence
of each judge and year with δj and δy, judge fixed effects and year fixed effects.
Crimei includes indicator variables for crime type and the grade of the crime,
and a continuous measure of the maximum and minimum legally allowed
sentence.45 DOSjt includes a day-of-week fixed effect (non-judge specific) and
the number of black and white defendants sentenced by judgej on DOSt.
43 With the cross validation, I estimate the model using 90% of the observations (randomly
sampled at the sentencing cohort level) and use the estimated coefficients to predict the
sentence lengths for the 10% out-of-sample observations. I then repeat this ten times to
obtain predicted sentences for the entirety of my sample. This approach helps avoid over-
fitting by disallowing defendants’ sentences to impact their predicted counterpart through
their influence on the estimated coefficients. Note, results are qualitatively similar when I do
not use cross validation.
44 As reported in Figure A1 in the Appendix, results of the analysis are qualitatively
similar when the awarded minimum sentence is used as the dependent variable.
45 There are 62 different crime types in the analysis and are narrowly defined. For example,
there are six crime types for assault and four for theft. Grade of crime represents severity
and can vary within crime type.
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Defendanti includes the defendant’s drug-dependency status, Offense Gravity
Score, Prior Record Score, age, gender, recommended maximum and minimum
sentence, and type of disposition (type of plea, trial, etc). To more robustly
control for differences in sentencing outcomes based on defendant race, all
control variables, excluding the judge fixed effect, are allowed to interact
separately by defendant race.46 The results of the empirical application are
strongly robust to the specific set of controls utilized to generate the predicted
values.
For each defendant, I then find the average predicted sentence of other
defendants in the defendant’s sentencing cohort and define it as
Mean-Other-Sentenceijt. To be clear, Mean-Other-Sentenceijt is not obtained
by using defendanti’s attirbutes, but instead from the attributes of the other
defendants in defendanti’s sentencing cohort. In the second stage of my
empirical procedure, I use defendanti’s estimated value of
Mean-Other-Sentenceijt as an explanatory variable in my primary estimated
equation, Equation 3:
Sentenceijt = δj + δy + β1Crimei + β2DOSjt + β3Defendanti + (3)
θMean-Other-Sentenceijt + εijt.
By including Mean-Other-Sentenceijt as my measure of co-dependency
across sentences, I am allowing the average predicted sentence of Defendanti’s
peers (who were sentenced by the same judge on the same day) to impact
Defendanti’s sentence. Crucially, all controls which are included in the first
stage (Equation 2) to obtain predicted sentences are included in the second
46 In order to gain statistical efficiency, I do not allow judge fixed effects to vary by
defendant race. However, the results are qualitatively similar when I allow the fixed effects
to vary in such way.
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stage (Equation 3), with Mean-Other-Sentenceijt as the sole addition. The
two-stage approach helps account for endogeneity concerns in the estimation of
Mean-Other-Sentenceijt on Sentenceijt, as defendants’ predicted sentences are
obtained using only observable attributes of the judge, case, and defendant,
with any co-dependencies or shared unobservables between sentences not
influencing predicted sentence, and thus not being captured in the prediction
of Mean-Other-Sentenceijt. Recall, a defendant’s own sentencing outcome is
not included in the calculation of Mean-Other-Sentenceijt (as the variable
specifically captures the average sentence of other defendants in a sentencing
cohort), so each defendant has a unique value of Mean-Other-Sentenceijt. In
heterogeneity analyses, I allow cohort-race-specific versions of
Mean-Other-Sentenceijt to impact sentencing outcomes. Due to the cross
validation and two-stage approach, I estimate bootstrapped standard errors
with 1,000 repetitions, allowing for clustering by judge.47
In order to attribute a causal relationship between
Mean-Other-Sentenceijt and Sentenceijt, one must make an assumption
regarding the exogeneity of other defendants’ characteristics on defendants’
sentences. As Mean-Other-Sentenceijt is calculated from first-stage predicted
values of other defendants, which are estimated using the observables of other
defendants, for the estimate of Mean-Other-Sentenceijt to act as a valid
instrument for the true average of other defendants’ sentences, the observables
of other defendants in a sentencing cohort must be exogenous to a defendant’s
sentence. This assumption is common throughout the spatial econometric
literature and implies any possible impact from other defendants’ observables
onto a defendant’s sentence manifest themselves only through the other
defendants’ sentences (see, e.g. Kelejian and Prucha (1998)). For example, if
47 Results are qualitatively similar when I run the analysis using a random forest to obtain
the predicted value of Mean-Other-Sentenceijt.
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the ages of other defendants in defendanti’s sentencing cohort impact
defendanti’s sentence, they do so only indirectly through the average sentence
of those other defendants, and the other ages themselves do not have a direct
impact on defendanti’s sentence.
To better understand what the estimate of θ in Equation 3 captures, and
what it does not, consider the following examples. Consider if judges group
defendants of a specific observable type onto the same DOS. Not only would
this lead to positive correlation between Sentenceijt and the average other
sentence length among defendants in a sentencing cohort, it would also lead to
positive correlation between Sentenceijt and the predicted value of
Mean-Other-Sentenceijt. However, as the source of correlation is observable
characteristics which are controlled for in the second stage regression, there
would be no correlation between Sentenceijt and the predicted
Mean-Other-Sentenceijt once control variables are used. Likewise, consider if
judges sentence defendants with similar unobservables on the same DOS.
Again, there would be positive correlation between Sentenceijt and the average
other sentence among defendants in a sentencing cohort, but now there would
not be correlation between Sentenceijt and the estimated
Mean-Other-Sentenceijt, as the unobservables are not captured in the first
stage prediction of Sentenceijt, and thus not captured in the calculation of
Mean-Other-Sentenceijt.
48 To allow for causal inference, my empirical
specification accounts for these possible on-observables grouping effects with
the inclusion of the control variables, and the on-unobservable grouping effects
by allowing errors to cluster by judge. In either case, the estimate of θ would
not be influenced by the grouping behavior.
48 See the results of the Monte-Carlo described in Section 2.5.2 for further evidence shared
unobservables among defendants in the same sentencing cohort do not influence my estimate
of θ.
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2.3.2 Data
The data used in the analysis covers adult criminal sentencing decisions
in Pennsylvania from 2007 to 2016, covering all crime types.49 The data is
structured at the judicial proceeding offense level, which describes the
sentencing for a single offense. As my data begins at the sentencing level, I do
not observe information regarding alleged criminal incidents which did not
result in a sentence being assigned. As such, any inference statements made
throughout the paper are conditional on the defendant already reaching the
sentencing stage of the judicial process.50 There are occasionally multiple
judicial proceeding offenses for the same incident, and therefore there can be
multiple observations for every defendant-judge-DOS combination. As my
analysis examines effects across defendants, as opposed to effects
within-defendants, across-offenses, I only include one observation per judicial
proceeding. Specifically, I include the observation associated with the judicial
proceeding offense categorized as the most serious offense per defendant.51
I simplify the analysis by only including black and white defendants (94%
of observations) and drop observations with missing values or with rare
characteristics which make the estimation of bootstrapped standard errors
implausible. Next, I drop all observations in which two or more defendants
within the same sentencing cohort shared a common date of offense (6% of
remaining observations). This reduces the chance any two defendants seen by
a judge on the same day were involved in the same incident, greatly increasing
the likelihood defendants seen by the same judge on the same DOS are
49 The data was provided by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.
50 It is easy to imagine other forms of co-dependneices between possible defendants (for
example, a police officer may decide whether to arrest someone based on how many other
individuals they have arrested that day). Thus, my estimates should be thought of a small
part of a potentially much larger story of inter-defendant effects within the judicial process.
51 The most serious offense per person is determined by the Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing, prior to sentencing.
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unrelated.52. Last, I drop observations in which a judge sentences a single
defendant on a given DOS, as the observations can not identify any
inter-defendant relations (10% of remaining observations). After data
trimming, I am left with 621,190 observations. I display summary statistics in
Table 3.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev Min Max
D
e
fe
n
d
a
n
t Defendants 621,190
Black (%) 25
Max Sentence 12 28 0 2,333
Min Sentence 4 13 0 300
J
u
d
g
e
Judges 404
Cases 1,538 1,470 101 10,750
Cases-Year 302 206 101 1,987
Cases-DOS 6 4 2 63
D
O
S
Days-of-Sentencing 110,991
Only Black (%) 7
Only White (%) 35
Identical Crime-Type (%) 5
Mean Max Sentence 14 20 0 480
Min Max Sentence 2 10 0 480
Max Max Sentence 37 51 0 2,333
Notes: The observational unit is the defendant, judge, and day-of-
sentencing in the above three groupings of summary statistics. Time
is in months.
As my analysis focuses on within-DOS interactions, I particularly
highlight summary statistics at the DOS level. Notably, of the 100,000 plus
days-of-sentencing, approximately 60% include the sentencing of defendants of
various races, only 5% include defendants which all have the same crime-type,
52 Note, my econometric procedure makes this sample restriction unnecessarily, but it
leads to greater standardization of the relationships between defendants on a DOS, easing
interpretability of possible inter-defendant effects. Results are unchanged when I do not
drop these observations
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and the average spread between the largest and smallest sentence awarded on
a day is approximately three years (which is over three times the length of the
average sentence in my sample). The summary statistics provide support that
the defendants sentenced on a particular DOS are different on both
observables and outcomes, suggesting enough variation exists in the data for
my econometric analysis to identify within-DOS relationships with adequate
precision.
2.4 Results
I present results of the analysis in four subsections. First, I estimate
baseline model as described in Equation 3 and plot the coefficient on
Mean-Other-Sentence. I also examine racial heterogeneity by allowing the
coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence to vary by defendant race. Second, I
further examine racial heterogeneity by allowing for racial heterogeneity
among the defendant’s sentencing cohort. That is, I allow a defendant’s
sentence to be impacted separately by black and white defendants in the
defendant’s sentencing cohort. Third, I examine non-racial sources of
defendant-type heterogeneity, and fourth, judge-type heterogeneity. Last, I
explore possible pathways in which judges may use the sentences of other
defendants in their sentencing-decisions.
2.4.1 Baseline Results
I display the baseline results of Equation 3 in Panel A of Figure 5.
One-month (one-year) higher average predicted sentences among other
defendants in defendants’ sentencing cohorts lead to defendants receiving 0.01
month (3.70 day) longer sentences, on average. While a one-year increase in
Mean-Other-Sentence is a realistically sized increase given the data, a four-day
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increase in sentence is relatively small, compared to the average sentence
length (the average sentence is approximately 12 months). Despite the
coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence being small in magnitude, the fact that it
is statistically significantly different from zero is both economically and
morally important; defendants receive variation in their sentence lengths due
to the sentences of other defendants.
Figure 5: The Role of Sentencing Cohorts
(a) Baseline Results (b) Defendant-Race Heterogeneity
Notes: Panel A displays the coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence in a regression on a
defendant’s maximum sentence. The coefficients capture the average change (in
months) in a defendant’s sentence due to being sentenced alongside defendants with
one-month longer average sentences. In Panel B, the coefficient is allowed to vary by
defendant race. 95% confidence intervals derived from bootstrapped standard errors,
allowed to cluster by judge, are shown.
The positive coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence does not imply on
average, defendants are receiving longer sentences than they would otherwise.
The positive coefficient implies the sentences of different defendants are
positively co-determined, meaning a longer (shorter) average sentence among
defendants in a defendant’s sentencing leads to a longer (shorter) sentence for
the defendant, on average. While there may be correlation among the
unobservable aspects of sentences for defendants in the same sentencing
cohort, the coefficient of interest does not capture this form of correlation, and
instead captures the average effect of the causal chain linking other defendants’
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sentences to particular defendants’ sentences.53 This relationship expands
upon the types of elements that have previously been found to influence
sentencing outcomes, from defendant-, crime-, judge-, and time-level, to now
include peer-level effects.
It is useful to compare the size of the effect to factors previously found to
influence sentence outcomes. Eren and Mocan (2018) find a collegiate football
upset loss leads to a 35-day increase in sentence length (on average, across
races). Given the estimate of the coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence, it would
take an increase of almost nine years in Mean-Other-Sentence to lead to a
35-day increase in defendants’ sentences, which exceeds the 99th percentile of
values of Mean-Other-Sentence. However, while upset losses occurred 14 times
over the 16 year sample (potentially affecting fewer than 1,000 defendants)
in Eren and Mocan (2018), the vast majority of all defendants in Pennsylvania
are sentenced on the same DOS as at least one other defendant, suggesting the
impact of Mean-Other-Sentence on sentences may be small, but is essentially
universally present across all defendants. Moreover, numerous sentences are
assigned on the average DOS, a single sentence has the potential to influence
multiple other sentences. For a specific example, these estimates suggest that
if a defendant found guilty of rape is added to a sentencing cohort with the
average number of defendants with an average value of Mean-Other-Sentence,
the other defendants sentence would increase approximately two months due
to the addition of the defendant found guilty of rape.54
Motivated by the various forms of heterogeneity across race found in the
literature, I rerun the second-stage equation, now allowing
53 For example, the role of temperature on sentencing behavior, as found in Heyes and
Saberian (2019), would manifest itself as positively correlated errors among defendants with
the same DOS, given my specification.
54 The average sentence of a defendant found guilty of rape is 207 months, the average
(across defendants) value of Mean-Other-Sentence is 12 months, and the average (across
defendants) number of defendants sentenced on a DOS is 9.
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Mean-Other-Sentence to interact with the defendant’s race. I display the
results in Panel B of Figure 5. Black and white defendants’ sentences increase
on average 5.35 and 2.84 additional days (not statistically different from each
other) due to one year longer average predicted other sentences, respectively.
Again, even if the estimated coefficients were statistically different from each
other, the fact that the black-specific coefficients on Mean-Other-Sentence is
larger than the white-specific coefficients would not necessarily imply
sentencing cohort effects penalize black defendants more than white defendants.
Instead, it would imply that on average, black defendants are subject to more
variation in their sentence as a result of their sentencing cohort.
2.4.2 Peer-Characteristic Heterogeneity
Next, I allow the races of a defendant’s peers to alter the effect
Mean-Other-Sentence has on the defendant’s sentence. I display the
coefficients on Mean-Other-Sentence when the peer groups are separated by
race in Panel A of Figure 6. Defendants’ sentences increase 1.35 and 2.60 days
due to one year higher values of Mean-Other-Sentence of black and white
peers, respectively. To calculate the effect of an overall (across peers of both
races) increase in Mean-Other-Sentence, one must sum both race-specific
effects. The coefficients are not statistically different from each other at
conventional levels. Admittedly, the interpretation of Figure 6 is limited
without allowing the coefficients on Mean-Other-Sentence of black (white)
peers to vary by the defendant’s race.
Thus, I display the coefficients on Mean-Other-Sentence when both the
peer groups and defendants are separated by race in Panel B of Figure 6.
Black defendants’ sentences increase 4.30 days due to one-year longer average
predicted sentence of black peers, and white defendants maximum sentences
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increase 5.08 days due to one-year longer average predicted sentence of white
peers, on average. The results suggest the presence of within-race effects; the
coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence of black peers for black defendants and
the coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence of white peers for white defendants are
both statistically significantly different from zero, but not from each other.
Moreover, the coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence of black peers for white
defendants and the coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence of white peers for
black defendants are not statistically different from each other, nor zero.55
Figure 6: The Role of Sentencing Cohorts by Cohort Race
(a) Cohort-Race Heterogeneity
(b) Defendant- and Cohort-Race Hetero-
geneity
Notes: Panel A displays the coefficients on cohort-race-specific Mean-Other-Sentence
in a regression on a defendant’s maximum sentence. The coefficients capture the
average change (in months) in a defendant’s sentence due to being sentenced
alongside defendants of a given race with one-month longer average sentences. In
Panel B, the coefficients are allowed to vary by defendant race. 95% confidence
intervals derived from bootstrapped standard errors, allowed to cluster by judge, are
shown.
Whereas the results of the baseline analysis (Panel A of Figure 5)
illustrate that the average sentence of defendants’ peers directly affects their
sentences, the current results may more precisely highlight the pathways at
work. The sentences of defendants’ same-race peers directly affect their
sentences, but the sentences of their other-race peers do not. The results sit
55 The across-race coefficients on Mean-Other-Sentence are statistically different from the
within-race coefficients at at least the 5% level in all cases.
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within a wide breadth of literature of behavioral economics, law, and
psychology (see, Jolls (2007) for an overview) that shows judges use a variety
of mental heuristics in their sentencing decisions (see, e.g., Guthrie et al.
(2001); Choi and Pritchard (2003)) and said heuristics are often connected
with race (see, e.g., Taylor et al. (1978); Fiske et al. (1991); Levinson (2007)).
However, it is important to note the cohort-race heterogeneity in the
estimated coefficients on Mean-Other-Sentence may be driven by a different,
unobserved form of heterogeneity, which happens to correlate with defendants’
races. Recall though, my empirical specification controls for many obserables,
all but the judge fixed effects which are allowed to vary by race. For example,
if there is correlation between defendants’ races and the quality of their
attorneys, and judges mentally group defendants with similar quality
attorneys, I would not capture attorney quality heterogeneity in my estimated
coefficients for the defendant, cohort rate-specific estimates of
Mean-Other-Sentence, as I allow my plea-deal indicator variable to interact
with defendant race.56 Nonetheless, I interpret the racial heterogeneity as
descriptive and do not claim a race-specific causal mechanism relates the
sentence lengths of defendants of the same race, but instead simply that there
is something which relates the sentences of defendants of the same race, but
not those of other races.
2.4.3 Defendant-Type Heterogeneity
While defendant and cohort race is a salient form of heterogeneity,
countless other forms exist. In each of this set of three heterogeneity analyses,
labeled A through C, I divide all defendants into one of three mutually
56 Moreover, Berdejò (2018) finds evidence that said correlation exists; there are significant
racial disparities in the quality of plea deals reached through bargaining.
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exclusive groups based on various characteristics.57 I then allow the coefficient
on Mean-Other-Sentence to vary by group.
Defining Defendant-Type
The first two heterogeneity analyses cut the data in ways that roughly
capture the expected length of incarceration time, with defendants of type 1
expected (based on observables) to receive the shortest sentence and
defendants of type 3 expected to receive the longest sentence. In Analysis A, I
divide defendants by their maximum legally allowed sentences; and in Analysis
B, by their offense gravity score. In Analysis C, I divide the defendants into
three groups based on whether they were sentenced with a plea deal:
defendants of type 1 did not have a standard plea deal, defendants of type 2
had a plea deal that was not negotiated, and defendants of type 3 had a plea
deal that was negotiated. Column (A) of Figure 7 displays histograms of the
heterogeneity examined in each analysis, with defendants of type 1 having the
lightest background, defendants of type 2 having the medium background, and
defendants of type 3 having the darkest background.
Defendant-Type Results
I present the results of the defendant-type heterogeneity analyses in
Figure 7. The results are consistent across heterogeneity analyses A and B,
with the estimated coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence increasing by defendant
type. In these two divisions of defendant type, the estimated coefficients on
Mean-Other-Sentence for defendants who are the most likely to receive low
incarceration times are negative, suggesting said defendants’ sentences are
inversely impacted by those of their peers; being sentenced alongside
57 For the sake of statistical power, I limit myself to defining three defendant types for
each heterogeneity analysis.
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defendants with longer sentences significantly decreases sentence length for
defendants who are expected (based on statutory maximum sentence or offense
gravity score) to receive a short sentence. However, the estimated coefficients
on Mean-Other-Sentence for defendants who are the most likely to receive
high incarceration times are large and statistically different from zero. Lastly,
when defendant type is measured by the defendant’s plea deal status, the
estimated coefficients are similar in magnitude and do not statistically vary.
The results suggest the positive and statistically significant coefficient on
Mean-Other-Sentence in the baseline regression is primarily being driven by
defendants who are expected, based on observables, to receive long
incarceration time. The result have suggestive policy insights. If judges were
to sentence defendants who are expected to receive similar-length sentences on
the same DOS, the average sentence length for defendants of 2 would likely be
similar. However for defendants of type 1, as removing defendants of type 2
and 3 from sentencing cohorts would decrease the value of
Mean-Other-Sentence and the coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence is negative,
sentence lengths would increase, on average. Similarly for defendants of type 3,
as the value of Mean-Other-Sentence would likely increase with the omission
of defendants of type 1 and 2 from sentencing cohorts and the coefficient on
Mean-Other-Sentence is positive, sentence lengths would increase, on average.
These patterns suggest there is not a clear policy change, which if implemented,
would predictably either increase of decrease average sentence length.
2.4.4 Judge-Type Heterogeneity
Due to the set of controls used in the estimation of Equation 3, the
variation that allows the coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence to be estimated
originates within judge. However, the impact of sentencing cohort effects need
53
Figure 7: Differential Effects by Defendant Type
(a) Defining Defendant-Type (b) The Role of Sentencing Cohorts
M
a
x
im
u
m
A
llo
w
e
d
S
e
n
te
n
c
e
O
ff
e
n
se
G
r
a
v
ity
S
c
o
r
e
P
le
a
D
e
a
l
S
ta
tu
s
Notes: Each row in Column (A) shows the division of defendants into defendant
types. The background color represents the defendant type, with defendant type
increasing in background color darkness. Each row in Column (B) shows the
estimated coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence when allowed to vary by defendant
type. 95% confidence intervals derived from bootstrapped standard errors, allowed
to cluster by judge, are shown. Defendant type is defined by the legally allowed
maximum sentence (top), Offense Gravity Score (middle), and plea deal status
(bottom).
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not be equal across judges. I do not have data on the demographic
characteristics of judges, but I can estimate an effect for various judge types.
Following the previous defendant-type heterogeneity analysis, I separate
judges into one of three types along two dimensions.
Defining Judge-Type
To separate judges into groups in the first judge-type heterogeneity
analysis, I first estimate the first stage regression as previously discussed
(without including ˆMean-Other-Sentence as an explanatory variable) and store
the residuals, εijt. I then calculate the within judge average value of the
absolute value of εijt to obtain a measurement of how well the model fits the
data for different judges. Based on the judge average values, I divide judges
into three types indicating relatively how much of the judge’s variation in
sentencing is controlled for using the explanatory variables.
In my second judge-type heterogeneity analysis, I store the residuals, εijt
obtained after the first stage regression, renaming them Errorit. For each
judge independently, I then regress Errorit on the set of judge-DOS fixed
effects, δt. Equation 4 describes the estimation:
Errorit = δt + εit (4)
where all subscripts are as previously noted.58 As Errorit is the summation of
numerous unobserved effects, some defendant-specific and some DOS-specific,
solely using δt, to capture Errorit sheds light on what proportion of Errorit
can be explained by day-of-sentencing effects. If judges exhibit no DOS effects
in their sentencing behavior, δt would be mean zero and the adjusted R
2 for
58 Recall, my sample selection procedure omitted all observations in which a judge saw a
single defendant on a DOS, so δt does not mechanically perfectly predict any Errorit.
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the regressions would be approximately zero. On the other hand, if all
unobserved effects stem from DOS-specific, and not defendant-specific,
variation, the set of δt would perfectly absorb all variation in Errorit and the
adjusted R2 would be one. In reality, Errorit is made up of both
defendant-specific and DOS-specific variation, but of varying proportions
across judges.
Column (A) of Figure 8 displays two histograms, which I use to define
judge type. As shown in the second row, day-of-sentencing fixed effects do
contribute to Errorit, but as the mean (median) adjusted R
2 is only 0.08
(0.07), there clearly is defendant-specific variation as well. The dispersion of
the adjusted R2’s highlights an important source of heterogeneity across
judges; the proportion of the average Errorit for a judge that is due to
DOS-level variation varies by judge. Given the histograms, I define three
judge types of approximately equal size based on: judges with little to no DOS
components of Errorit (displayed with the lightest background), judges with
moderate DOS components of Errorit (displayed with the medium
background), and judges with the most DOS components of Errorit
(displayed with the darkest background). I define judge type in an analogous
manner for the other type of heterogeneity. The model as described in
Section 2.3.1 is again ran for each measure of heterogeneity, now allowing the
effect of Mean-Other-Sentence to vary by judge type. I present results in
Column (B) of Figure 8.
Judge-Type Results
When judge heterogeneity is measured by the average magnitude of the
first stage errors (first row) and how accurately judge-DOS fixed effects predict
first stage errors (second row), the estimated coefficients on
56
Figure 8: Differential Effects by Judge Type
(a) Defining Judge-Type (b) The Role of Sentencing Cohorts
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Notes: Each row in Column (A) shows the division of judges into judge types.
The background color represents the judge type, with judge type increasing in
background color darkness. Each row in Column (B) shows the estimated coefficient
on Mean-Other-Sentence when allowed to vary by the corresponding judge type.
95% confidence intervals derived from bootstrapped standard errors, allowed to
cluster by judge, are shown. Judge type is defined by the magnitude of the within
judge average first stage residual (top) and the explanatory power of judge-DOS
fixed effects in an estimation of first stage residuals (bottom).
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Mean-Other-Sentence vary by judge type. When divided by the magnitude of
the average error term, it is not surprising the coefficient on
Mean-Other-Sentence increase by judge type, as the amount of variation left
to be captured by Mean-Other-Sentence mechanistically increases by judge
type. However, said relationship is not present when judges are divided by the
predictive power of judge-DOS fixed effects in explaining first stage errors, as
they are divided by values of adjusted R2, which measure explanatory power
in percent terms. Nonetheless, judges whose unexplained elements of
sentencing decisions are best explained by DOS fixed effects also tend to
exhibit the strongest inter-defendant tendencies in their rulings, while judges
whose first stage errors are less predictable given DOS fixed effects exhibit a
considerably weaker, if any at all, level of inter-defendant effects.
The results are consistent with the notion that the judges who are most
heavily influenced by aggregate day of sentence effects are also the judges who
are most heavily influenced by inter-defendant effects. However, as aggregate
day of sentencing effects include the average co-dependency given my
specification, the two measures are not easily untangled. Nonetheless, the
finding suggests the same types of defendants may be more prone to receive
variation in their awarded sentence length along a variety of dimensions,
meaning the total amount of non-defendant-specific variation in defendants’
sentenced are unlikely to even out in sum, and in fact may be greater that first
appears for some defendants when solely considering a single source of
non-defendant-specific variation.
2.4.5 Further Exploration of Co-Dependencies
In addition to judges using information about other defendants sentenced
on a particular DOS when assigning sentences, they may also use information
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about defendants sentenced on a different DOS. To examine this possibility, I
rerun the empirical specification, but now include four leads and lags of
Mean-Other-Sentence as explanatory variables. Each captures the average
sentence length of defendants sentenced on a DOS l days away from DOSt,
where l is the degree of lead or lag. For example, the first lag of
Mean-Other-Sentence allows for the average sentence of defendants sentenced
on the DOS immediately prior to defendants’ days-of-sentencing to influence
their sentences.59 I display the estimated coefficients in Figure 9.
Figure 9: The Role of Time Varying Sentencing Cohorts
Notes: The figure displays the coefficients on Mean-Other-Sentence
and four leads and lags in a regression on a defendant’s sentence.
For example, the second lag captures the average sentence of
defendants sentenced by a judge two sentencing days prior to the
sentencing day of the defendant. 95% confidence intervals derived
from bootstrapped standard errors, allowed to cluster by judge, are
shown.
As illustrated, the average sentences awarded on different
days-of-sentencing (same judge) do not appear to impact defendants’
59 On average, there is approximately one week between days-of-sentencing for a given
judge.
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sentences, on average. The result is consistent with judges being able to
mentally separate cases across days-of-sentencing, potentially eliminating
co-dependencies between sentences. Moreover, this strongly implies the
coefficient of interest in the baseline specification captures an effect which
specifically connects multiple defendants sentenced on the same DOS, and not
simply defendants sentenced by the same judge, or even by the same judge
around the same time. Moving forward, my co-dependency exploration focuses
estimating patterns of judicial behavior within days-of-sentencing.
As I do not observe the within-day ordering of defendants, I am only able
to capture the average inter-defendant effect between sentences of all
defendants sentenced on the same DOS. This is opposed to, for example,
measuring the impact of the specific sentence which was awarded immediately
prior to a defendant’s sentencing. Moreover, my baseline specification does not
flexibly allow for the number of “others” who contribute to
Mean-Other-Sentence to differently influence the impact Mean-Other-Sentence
has on sentencing outcomes. However, this restriction can be modified, and
exploring heterogeneity in the estimates on Mean-Other-Sentence based on the
number of defendants sentenced on the DOS can give support for, or against,
various possible pathways.
Single Dependency
One potential type of dependency which would result in a positive
coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence is that of judges being impacted by a
single other sentence they award on a DOS while awarding other sentences
throughout that day. This specific influential sentence could be “chosen” in a
variety of ways; for example, it may be first sentence awarded on a DOS which
influences all subsequent sentences. If this type of dependency is driving my
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baseline result, there would be no co-dependencies between the majority of
defendant-to-defendant pairs. Thus, as the number of defendants sentenced on
a DOS increases, the coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence should
mechanistically decrease and converge to zero, as on average, the number of
pairs of defendants with co-dependencies would increase and the single source
of co-dependency would play a smaller role in the entirely of the
defendant-to-defendant relationships.
Prior Cumulative Dependency
Another plausible type of dependency which would result in a positive
coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence is that of judges being impacted by every
sentence they previously awarded on a DOS. In this scenario, the within-DOS
ordering of cases is influential in the determination of a particular defendant’s
sentence, as sentences awarded later in the day are impacted by more other
sentences. This type of dependency would lead to variation in the coefficients
on Mean-Other-Sentence across the number of sentences awarded on a DOS, as
now indirect defendant-to-defendant effects could manifest.60 As the number
of sentences assigned on a DOS increases, the number of indirect effects also
increases, and thus the average defendant-to-defendant effect would grow in
magnitude, leading to a larger coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence. However,
as long as the direct defendant-to-defendant effect is smaller than one, the
series of coefficients on Mean-Other-Sentence would eventually converge to a
positive constant, as the average additive importance of new indirect effects
formed by an additional sentence being awarded on a DOS would converge to
zero as the number of links between the defendants increased.
60 For example, the first sentence would directly influence the second and third sentence,
but also indirectly effect the third through its effect on the second sentence (which then also
has a direct influence on the third sentence).
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All Cumulative Dependency
Last, it is possible judges are not only influenced by every sentence they
previously awarded on a DOS (Prior Cumulative Dependency), but also all
future sentences they award that day. This could occur if judges determine all
sentences simultaneously, prior to the actual DOS, and simply use the DOS to
report the sentences to the defendants. Similar to Prior Cumulative
Dependency, as the number of sentences awarded increases, so does the number
of indirect effects between defendants. While each additional sentence is
impacted by previously sentenced cases, it also directly and indirectly impacts
all previously assigned sentences. This type of dependency would result in a
strikingly different pattern in the coefficients on Mean-Other-Sentence, as the
estimated average effect would grow exponentially as sentences are added onto
a DOS, as opposed to eventually converging.
Each of the three proposed pathways would lead to a different pattern
across the estimated coefficients on Mean-Other-Sentence when allowed to
vary by the number of defendants sentenced on a DOS. I show the theorized
estimated coefficients on Mean-Other-Sentence across varying cohort sizes for
each of the three pathways in Figure 10. Additionally, I display the theorized
coefficients on Mean-Other-Sentence when sentences are awarded
independently. In Panel A, the direct sentence- to -sentence effect is set to
equal 0.2 (intuitively meaning, if the average other sentence increases by 1
month, a defendant’s sentence would increase by 0.2 months, ignoring any
spill-over effects), while in Panel B it is set to equal 0.01. As illustrated in
Panel B, which is generated using a direct effect size which more closely
matches the estimated coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence in the baseline
specification, the patterns derived from Prior Cumulative Dependency and All
Cumulative Dependency are similar for the range of values in question, but
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distinctly different from that derived from Single Dependency. As such, it may
be statistically difficult to distinguish between Prior and All Cumulative
Dependency when examining the empirical results.
Figure 10: Theoretical Trends of Mean-Other-Sentence Across Size of Sentenc-
ing Cohort
(a) When Direct Effect Equals 0.2 (b) When Direct Effect Equals 0.01
Notes: Panels A and B display three patterns of theorized coefficients on
Mean-Other-Sentence when allowed to vary by sentencing cohort size. The
three dependencies examined are when effects occur between each defendant in a
sentencing cohort (All Cumulative Dependency: Dotted Black Line), effects occur
between defendants in a chronological order (Prior Cumulative Dependency: Solid
Red Line), and an effect occurs between a single sentence and another sentence
(Single Dependency: Dashed Blue Line). A reference line displaying the pattern of
coefficients when no co-dependencies are present is also shown (dashed green line).
The direct sentence-to-sentence effect is assumed to be 0.2 in Panel A and 0.01 in
Panel B.
Next, I rerun the baseline regression, allowing the coefficient on
Mean-Other-Sentence to vary by the number of sentences awarded on the
DOS. I display a histogram of the number of cases sentenced per DOS in
Panel A and the estimated coefficients in Panel B of Figure 11. The red
dashed reference line in Panel B illustrates the point estimate on
Mean-Other-Sentence from the baseline specification, when the coefficient is
not allowed to vary by the number of sentences awarded on the DOS. While
some heterogeneity exists among the coefficients, none of the coefficients are
statistically different from each other, nor the coefficient estimated in the
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baseline model. Even disregarding lack of statistical precision, there does not
appear to be a meaningful trend in the estimates.
Figure 11: Empirical Examination of the Role of Sentencing Cohort Size
on Estimates of Mean-Other-Sentence
(a) Number of Cases per Judge-Day (b) Estimates of Mean-Other-Sentence
Notes: Panel A displays a histogram of the number of sentences awarded by each
judge on a DOS. Panel B shows the coefficients of Mean-Other-Sentence when
allowed to vary by the number of sentences awarded on the DOS. 95% confidence
intervals derived from bootstrapped standard errors, allowed to cluster by judge,
are shown. The point estimates show the effect (in months) of a one-month
increase in the average sentence of other defendants in the defendant’s sentencing
cohort on a defendant’s sentence. A reference line displaying the estimate of
Mean-Other-Estimate when not allowed to vary is also displayed (dashed red line).
The pattern of the estimates strongly suggest judges do not operate
under a routine of Single Dependency, as the estimates do not decline as the
number of defendants in a sentencing cohort increases. The results are
consistent with the notions of judges operating with a Prior Cumulative
Dependency or an All Cumulative Dependency, and as expected, I do not have
enough statistical power to meaningfully distinguish between the two. Overall,
the results provide further evidence that co-determination of sentences across
defendants are present in a wide range of sentencing scenarios.
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2.5 Robustness Exercises
I undertake two robustness exercises to further support the validity of the
results and provide evidence the non-zero coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence
is not derived from my econometric procedure. As Mean-Other-Sentence is
calculated using the same data used in the second stage regression, it is
possible values of Sentence and Mean-Other-Sentence are correlated within
judge, and not specifically judge-DOS. Furthermore, if said correlation does
exist, it is possible including Mean-Other-Sentence as an explanatory variable
in the second stage regression may lead to a non-zero coefficient, even if no
causal relationship exists.
2.5.1 Using Other Defendant Mean-Other-Sentence
In the first robustness check, I begin by estimating the first stage
regression as described in Section 2.3.1, and obtain the estimated values of
Mean-Other-Sentence. Before continuing to the second stage regression, I
assign each observation a new value of Mean-Other-Sentence, randomly chosen
from the set of all estimated values of Mean-Other-Sentence associated with
judgej and DOS−t. That is, each observation is randomly given the predicted
value of Mean-Other-Sentence of a different defendant sentenced by the same
judge (on a different DOS). If the previously estimated coefficient on
Mean-Other-Sentence truly reflects sentencing cohort interactions, the
estimated coefficients when the incorrect values of Mean-Other-Sentence are
used in the second stage should be mean zero.
I display a histogram of said coefficients, generated from 1,000 iterations,
in Figure 12. The coefficients have a mean value of zero. Additionally, the
range of estimated coefficients is far below that of the estimate on
Mean-Other-Sentence in my baseline specification of 0.01 (0.01 is over 8
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standard deviations away from the mean of the distribution). The results
provide support for the interpretation that the positive coefficient on
Mean-Other-Sentence is driven by judge-DOS specific interactions. My next
robustness exercise furthers this support, and additionally provides evidence
that unobservable effects shared by defendants in a sentencing cohort do not
influence the estimation of the coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence.
Figure 12: Estimates of θ Using Random Mean-Other-Sentence
Notes: The above histograms display 1,000 point estimates
on Mean-Other-Sentence. Each simulated point estimate is
generated from the estimation of Equation 3, where the values of
Mean-Other-Sentence are randomly chosen from the set of all Mean-
Other-Sentence’s associated with judgej . Thus, the coefficients
capture the effect the average other maximum sentence among
defendants sentenced by judgej on DOS−t have on a defendant’s
maximum sentence length while sentenced by judgej on DOSt. For
reference, the estimated coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence in the
baseline specification is 0.011.
2.5.2 Monte Carlo Simulation
My second robustness exercise exists in a purely simulated environment;
no real-world data is utilized. In short, I randomly create data that exhibits
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known co-dependencies in sentences, and then I test whether my empirical
specification correctly identifies the parameters.
My simulated data set matches the structure of the Pennsylvania data;
the observational unit is a defendant, who was sentenced, along with numerous
other defendants, by a judge in a year on a day.61 I randomly generate race
(bi-variate), generic explanatory variables (combination of uniformly and
normally distributed), a random unobservable term (normally distributed) for
each defendant, and a both a judge and judge-DOS fixed effect for each judge
(both normally distributed). With the created variables, I then begin to
calculate the “Y” variable (simulated sentencing outcome) for each observation.
I also force the average other “Y” for a given sentencing cohort to directly
impact “Y” itself. Equation 5 displays the true data generating process.
Yijt = βXi + δj + δjyt + θY−ijt +Randomijt (5)
where all subscripts are equivalent as previously noted.62
I estimate the model using the two stage approach discussed in
Section 2.3.1. Recall, my empirical specification does not include judge-DOS
fixed effects, while they are part of the true data generating process in the
simulated data. The judge-DOS fixed effects can be thought of as capturing,
for example, the average mood of the judge, which is a shared component of
61 In the presented results, each simulation is run on 200,000 observations (80 judges, 5
years per judge, 50 sentencing days per judge-year, 10 individuals per judge-DOS). Results
are robust to varying sample parameters.
62 In order to create Y that in itself depends on a weighted version of Y , I undertake
an iterative process. I create an initial version of Y that does not depend on the weighted
version of Y (call the vector Y i), calculate Y−ijt for each observation, and use them to create
a new version of Y , as described in Equation 5 (call the vector Y i+1). I then compute the
difference between associated elements of Y i and Y i+1. If either the 5th or 95th percentile
difference is greater than a specific threshold in absolute value, I repeat the process, now
using Y i as the initial version of Y. Note, this is more selective than solely ensuring the
average difference is smaller than a threshold. In the presented simulated results, I use a
threshold of 0.0001 (the average element of Y is approximately 20) and the process typically
converges after seven iterations.
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all sentences awarded by that judge on that day. If the empirical specification
is correctly specified and θ̂ captures the causal effect of the average other
sentence on a defendant’s sentence, the omission of the judge-DOS fixed effects
from the estimated equation should not impact the estimation of θ, as the
judge-DOS effects should not be captured in the first-stage prediction of Y−ijt.
I run the simulation twice, once with θ set to equal 0, and once with θ set to
equal 0.02.
I display the histograms of the estimates of θ in Panels A and B of
Figure 13, each compiled from 1,000 simulations. The estimated coefficients
are narrowly dispersed, with mean values equal to the true parameters. This
provides evidence the prediction procedure is working as expected, and shared
unobservables among a sentencing cohort (the judge-DOS fixed effects) do not
impact the estimate of the coefficient of interest. Furthermore, I display the
95% confidence intervals for errors allowed to cluster by judge for estimates of
θ, which are ordered in size, in Panels C and D. In both cases, the true value
of θ is captured within the confidence intervals in approximately 95% of the
simulations.
Next, I run the robustness analysis described in Section 12 on the
simulated data. That is, instead of using the correct value of Y−ijt in the
estimation, I use a (within judge, across DOS) random value of Y−ijt. I again
run the simulation twice, once with θ set to 0, and once with θ set to 0.02. I
report results in Figure 14, which provides evidence the first robustness
analysis behaves as expected.
2.6 Conclusion
Judges hold the incredible power to incarcerate citizens for years on end,
and for that power, their decisions should be scrutinized from every angle.
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Figure 13: Simulated Estimates of θ
(a) Distribution of θ̂ when true θ = 0 (b) Distribution of θ̂ when true θ = 0.02
(c) 95% CI for θ̂ when true θ = 0 (d) 95% CI for θ̂ when true θ = 0.02
Notes: Panel A displays the estimates of θ from 1,000 simulations, in which the
true value of θ is set to 0. Panel B again displays the estimates of θ, now compiled
from 1,000 simulations in which the true value of θ is set to 0.02. Panel (C) and
(D) display 95% confidence intervals for the ordered estimates in Panel A and (B),
respectively.
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Figure 14: Robustness within Simulated Environment
(a) Coefficient on θ̂ when true θ = 0,
while using Within-Judge Random Y−ijt
(b) Coefficient on θ̂ when true θ = 0.02,
while using Within-Judge Random Y−ijt
(c) 95% CI for θ̂ when θ = 0, while using
Within-Judge Random Y−ijt
(d) 95% CI for θ̂ when θ = 0.02, while
using Within-Judge Random Y−ijt
Notes: Panel A displays the estimates of θ from 1,000 simulations, in which the true
value of θ is set to 0. Panel B again displays the estimates of θ, now compiled from
1,000 simulations in which the true value of θ is set to 0.02. In both Panel A and (b)
a within-judge random value of ˆY−ijt is used in replace of the true estimate. Panel
(C) and (D) display 95% confidence intervals for the ordered estimates in Panel A
and (B), respectively.
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However, researchers have so far made a seemingly innocuous, but potentially
misleading assumption that judges’ decisions for one case do not impact their
decisions for others. This assumption deserves to be explored.
In this paper, I examine the sentencing decisions of Pennsylvania judges,
allowing for the possibility sentencing decisions for various defendants do not
occur independently. Doing so, I find defendants’ sentence lengths are
influenced by variation in the average sentence length of other defendants
sentenced by the same judge on the same day; a one-year higher average of the
predicted sentences of other defendants leads to a four-day increase in
defendants’ sentences, on average. My econometric approach accounts for both
potential endogeneity between sentences and judges grouping defendants onto
specific days of sentencing by using predicted, as opposed to observed, values
of other defendants sentences. Racial heterogeneity analysis further explores
the types of dependencies at play and reveals that while the sentences of black
(white) defendants are influenced by the average sentence of other black
(white) defendants, judges do not appear to take the average sentence of
other-race defendants into account when sentencing. Additional heterogeneity
analysis reveals differing effects based on both judge, and defendant type
(defined along a variety of measures). Lastly, a robustness exercise provides
evidence that judges’ sentencing decisions are not influenced by the average
sentence of defendants they sentenced on other days, and a Monte-Carlo
simulation finds results that are consistent with my empirical procedure
producing unbiased estimates of the parameter of interest.
The results have far-reaching moral implications and should act as a
springboard for further research into the co-determination of sentences across
defendants. Future work should investigate additional pathways in which the
procedures judges utilize in their sentencing decisions for specific defendants
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overlap with one another and cause defendants’ sentencing outcomes to be
co-determined. Research in behavioral economics offer may provide insight
into the specific mental-heuristics at play, which will assist in implementing
changes to courts’ sentencing procedures to reduce the amount defendants’
sentences are influenced by random variation, ultimately leading to a more
just judicial system.
While the existence of sentencing cohorts provides opportunity for
co-dependencies between the sentences of different defendants who happen to
be sentenced by the same judge on the same, the fact some defendants are
sentenced for multiple offenses at once provides opportunities for
within-defendant dependencies. In the third chapter of my dissertation, I
examine this possibility and consider its implications for the understanding of
racial biases in sentencing.
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CHAPTER III
MULTIPLE OFFENSES, CONCURRENT SENTENCING, AND RACIAL
GAPS IN SENTENCING OUTCOMES
The research described in this chapter was developed by myself and a
co-author, Glen Waddell. I have fully participated in every aspect of the
process—initial research design, data acquisition, empirical methods, and both
the writing and continued revision of research output.
3.1 Introduction
Across the United States, criminal-sentencing guidelines typically inform
judges about the offense and offender attributes that should be considered in
assigning sentences to those for which guilt has been determined. While states
differ in procedure—some use grids or worksheet scoring systems, some employ
sophisticated algorithms—the goals of guidelines typically collapse around
offenders with similar offenses and criminal histories being treated alike.63
That said, judges often find little guidance on the sentencing of
defendants who face coincident sentencing decisions. There is also a surprising
lack of empirical work on the role of multiplicity in sentencing outcomes. As
such, the literature leaves us largely uninformed about the treatment of those
facing multiple sentences, either with respect to their sentencing of specific
crimes or with respect to their ultimate sentence, arrived at through both
63 Guidelines vary considerably across states. In Pennsylvania, which is the state from
which we draw our data, the 1978 “Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing” created a
statewide sentencing policy that would increase sentencing severity for serious crimes and
promote fairer and more-uniform sentencing practices. Judges are required to complete
a sentencing judgment form—a grid with 14 offense and 8 prior record levels that maps
into suggested sentencing outcomes. The language does not indicate that the guidelines are
mandatory, and defense counsel can appeal based on the fact that a judge “departed from
the guidelines and imposed an unreasonable sentence.”
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sentence length and the judge’s determination that some or all should be
served concurrently. It is not an insignificant number of cases for which this is
relevant. For example, across all sentencing hearings from the Common Pleas
Courts of Pennsylvania between 2007 and 2016, over 30 percent of defendants
(over 50 percent of offenses) enter sentencing hearings facing multiple sentence
determinations.
Most empirical analysis of sentencing is performed at the offense level,
with analysis typically being performed on the most-severe crime for each
defendant (Berdejò, 2018; Aizer and Doyle, 2015; Steffensmeier and Britt,
2002; Mustard, 2001; Gruhl et al., 1981).64 Thus, there is typically no regard
for the reality that defendants often face multiple offenses and therefore
multiple and simultaneous sentences. Even by the inclusion of multiple
sentences—documenting patterns in the sentencing of criminals with multiple
offenses, and the systematic application of concurrent sentencing—our analysis
contributes to a large literature on sentencing.
Before accounting for concurrent sentencing, we find mixed evidence of
independence in sentencing across multiplicity—while judges are relatively less
likely to incarcerate defendants with multiple offenses given their multiple
offenses, they impose slightly longer sentences to what one would expect if
each of the defendant’s offenses were treated as if it were the only offense.
That said, it proves important to account for the use of concurrent sentencing,
where we find a strikingly different pattern. Compared to what one would
expect under an assumption of independent and consecutive sentences, the
64 Chen (2008) is an exception—in California, an additional charge is associated with a
three-percent increase in sentence length. Lovegrove (2004) summarizes interviews (n = 8)
that suggest that Australian judges consider the overall sentence length in their determination
of sentences for individual offenses for those who face multiple sentences—if the null hypothesis
is that judges make independent decisions across multiple sentences, we interpret this as a
proof of concept. See Ryberg et al. (2017) for an overview of a small theoretical literature
that considers issues related to defendants with multiple offenses.
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average sentence length is 56 percent as long for those with even a second
guilty verdict, reaching only 35 percent as long for those with seven guilty
verdicts.
Directly considering the role of multiplicity will also inform our
understanding of racial discrepancies in criminal justice. It is well documented
that black individuals face more-severe punishments, all else equal—in traffic
stops (Horrace and Rohlin, 2016), bail (Arnold et al., 2018), plea bargaining
(Berdejò, 2018), jury decisions (Flanagan, 2018), and death sentences
(Eberhardt et al., 2006). While the unconditioned gap in black–white
sentencing is partially contributed to by differences in the underlying offenses,
conditioning on offense and criminal history, the literature supports
black–white sentencing gaps on the order of 10-to-15 percent (Rehavi and
Starr, 2014; Mustard, 2001).65
We also find important and troubling patterns in the effect of multiple
sentences on the gap in sentencing outcomes for white and black defendants,
with evidence that both multiplicity itself, and the use of concurrent
sentencing, further gaps in sentencing outcomes. After accounting for both
multiplicity in sentencing and controlling for the role of concurrent sentencing,
we find overall racial discrepancies in defendants’ total sentences to be
28-percent larger for black defendants with two offenses compared to those
experienced by black defendants with a single offense, with the. Conditional
on those incarcerated, discrepancies are 346-percent larger for black defendants
with two offenses compared to black defendants with a single offense.
In Section 3.2 we describe our data and document the prevalence of
multiple-sentence determination. In Section 3.3 we present our empirical
65 As racial disparities in sentencing are often driven by differences in a defendant’s
likelihood of being jailed at all (Abrams et al., 2012; Demuth and Steffensmeier, 2004),
throughout our analysis we will examine both the intensive and extensive margins of
sentencing.
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analysis, which we follow with a discussion of the policy implications in
Section 3.4.
3.2 Data
To consider the role of multiple-sentencing in judicial outcomes, we use
administrative data files from the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing,
spanning all criminal sentencing in the Common Pleas Courts of Pennsylvania
between 2007 and 2016. Selection into the sample is conditioned on guilt
having been determined—we have every guilty verdict within the Court
system. These guilty verdicts are then sentenced by an individual judge on a
given day, regardless of the dates the offenses were committed. Our data do
not include arrest information, so we will be careful to limit our inference to
the sentence behavior conditional on guilt.66
We drop all observations for defendants who receive a minimum or
maximum offense sentence that is longer than the 99th percentile of offense
sentence length (roughly two percent of the sample), and all observations for
defendants with any missing or infeasible values (fewer than one percent of
remaining observations).67 We also discard defendants with more than seven
guilty offenses—the 99th percentile in the distribution of defendants in the
Pennsylvania data. We provide summary statistics at the offense and
defendant levels in Table 3. As shown in Table 3, there are considerable
66 As judge’s sentencing behavior can vary with defendant gender (Butcher et al., 2017),
we drop all female defendants from the analysis—they account for twenty percent of guilty-
verdict observations in the dataset. We also drop defendants who are not white or black—this
amounts to six percent of all defendants, and seven percent of all offenses. Patterns evident
in other races are similar to those of black defendants.
67 Dropping the top-one percent of offense sentence lengths amounts to roughly two percent
of observations because we drop all observations for defendants, not just their offense in
the 99th percentile, but also because offenses with minimum-sentence lengths greater than
the 99th percentile are not the very same set of offenses with maximum-sentence lengths
greater than the 99th percentile. In rare cases, we drop observations with impossible values,
such as when minimum sentences are longer than maximum sentences, again dropping all
observations for defendants.
76
differences in racial discrepancies when using offenses versus defendants as the
unit of analysis— for example, while black defendants are four percentage
points more likely than white defendants to be incarcerated for any offense
(47- vs. 43-percent), they are eight percentage points more likely to be
incarcerated for at least one offense (57- vs. 49-percent).
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Offense Defendant
(n=946,393) (n=631,487)
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
White 69% 71%
Number of Offenses 1 0 1.45 0.92
Receive incarceration 43% 49%
Sentence length
Unconditional 98 248 143 447
Conditional on jail time 228 336 292 603
Black 31% 29%
Number of Offenses 1 0 1.61 1.04
Receive incarceration 47% 57%
Sentence Length
Unconditional 198 391 318 744
Conditional on jail time 422 482 558 915
Notes: Time is in days.
While the modal defendant faces sentencing on only one guilty verdict, a
large fraction of defendants do face multiple, coincident sentencing decisions.
In Panel A of Figure 15 we plot the incidence of coincident guilty verdicts,
separately for white and black defendants—more than 30 percent of
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defendants face multiple sentencing decisions, with a non-negligible fraction
(two percent) being sentenced for more-than-four offenses. In Panel B of
Figure 15 we plot the same data at the offense level—over 50 percent of all
guilty verdicts are attributable to defendants who face a coincident sentencing
decision, and 8 percent of offenses are attributable to defendants who face
more than four coincident sentencing decisions. These frequencies strike us as
sizable—especially as the literature has largely ignored the potential
implications of multiple sentencing. If over half of all offenses have a defendant
in common, the scope for a richer understanding of sentencing outcomes is
likewise sizable. Given a higher degree of multiple sentencing among black
defendants, ignoring multiplicity in sentencing may also have important
implications for our understand of racial disparities in criminal justice.
Figure 15: The frequency of multiple offenses, by defendant race
(a) Defendants (n = 631,487) (b) Offenses (n = 946,393)
Notes: The above histograms show the distribution of the number of coincident guilty verdicts, by
defendant race, both in terms of both defendants and offenses.
3.3 Empirics
Below, we consider the relationship between the number of coincident
guilty verdicts and the intensive (incarceration) and extensive (sentence
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length) margins of sentencing. We find evidence that judges use discretion
while assigning sentences to be served consecutively or concurrently. We then
isolate the racial effects separately from any direct impact the number of
coincident guilty verdicts and we find systematic patterns of behavior that
reveal a race-based gap in sentencing that is between 25 and 75 percent larger
than what is commonly found in the literature.
3.3.1 The likelihood of incarceration
In Panel A of Figure 16 we plot the unadjusted mean probabilities that
defendants receive jail time for at-least-one offense, across those who face
different numbers of guilty verdicts. Part of this relationship is mechanistic, of
course—with more opportunity to receive jail time, we anticipate at-least some
jail time with higher probability. However, as we illustrate, the increase in the
unadjusted probabilities fall short of what one would expect given the
treatment of single-sentence defendants. For example, defendants with only
one guilty verdict are incarcerated with a probability of 0.46, and to assume
this probability across all offenses significantly overstates the likelihood that
defendants with multiple offenses will receive any jail time. That jail time is
everywhere less likely than what would result from independence across
multiple sentences suggests either a direct role for multiple sentences in
determining outcomes, or a selection into multiple crimes that drives outcomes.
Though, selection here would be of a kind such that attributes associated with
less-severe sentencing of defendants with multiple sentences, and selection into
crimes that are less likely to be jailed. This is not the selection one anticipate,
we believe, where “more-criminally inclined” defendants select into more guilty
verdicts. The pattern evident in Panel A is consistent, however, with the
multiplicity actively attenuating the severity of sentencing decisions.
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In Panel B of Figure 16 we plot estimates of the effect of multiplicity on
the probability a defendant receives any jail time. To fit the data-generating
process flexibly, we consider the offense-level model
1
(
Ki∑
k=1
Sentenceicj > 0
)
= α + ΩKi + X
′
icβ + δc + γj + εicj , (6)
where 1
(∑Ki
k=1 Sentenceicj > 0
)
captures whether defendant d seen by judge
j receives jail time for any of the Ki offenses for which d has been found guilty.
(By construction, this allows defendants with multiple offenses to have more
weight in the estimator, which we adjust for by estimating standard errors
allowing for clustering at the defendant-by-judge level.) Across defendants
with varying number of guilty verdicts, we measure the differences in the
probability of being incarcerated in ΩK . In Xic we include race fixed effects,
age (in five-year bins), and i’s “prior-record score” to absorb any effect of
criminal history on sentencing.68 We also include the statutory
minimum-sentence length for crime c, and the offense-gravity score, which
varies across i within c.69 We also control for crime δc and judge κj fixed
effects throughout the analysis.70
Reporting the estimated differences in the probability of receiving any
jail time across defendants who face K ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} guilty
verdicts—derived from the ΩK fixed effects in Equation (6)—again identifies a
role for the number of coincident guilty verdicts in sentencing decisions.
68 The “prior-record score” is a measure of criminal history for instances that occurred
prior to the judicial proceeding—contemporaneous offenses do not factor into this score.
Moreover, of prior sentences which were assigned concurrently, just that of which was defined
as “the most serious offense” in the judicial proceeding is used in the calculation of the
prior-record score. 204 Pa. Code § 303.5(b)(1).
69 The “offense-gravity score” measures the intensity of the offense and varies within
crime-type so can be estimated even with the inclusion of crime fixed effects.
70 Note that “crime fixed effects” are quite specific, encompassing 82 distinct crime types,
and our specification therefore quite flexible. For example, we include thirteen categories of
homicide and eight categories of assault.
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Figure 16: How does a defendant’s likelihood of being incarcerated change
across the number of coincident guilty verdicts?
(a) Unadjusted means across multiplicity (b) Estimated effects of multiplicity
Notes: In Panel A we plot the mean probabilities that a defendant is incarcerated across the number of
coincident guilty verdicts faced by defendants. In Panel B we plot the estimated impacts of multiplicity in
offenses on the probability of incarceration (i.e., the percent difference relative to defendants with a single
offense)—we control for race fixed effects, age (in five-year bins), each defendant’s “prior-record score” to
absorb any effect of criminal history on sentencing, the statutory minimum-sentence lengths for the crime,
the offense-gravity score, and crime- and judge-fixed effects. In both Panel A and B, the dotted line
represents the prediction under the assumption of independence across number of guilty verdicts, with
differences in observables across the number of coincident guilty verdicts being accounted for in Panel B,
but not Panel A.
Despite the many restrictions on the identifying information, the estimated
differences associated with multiple guilty verdicts (in Panel B) follow a
similar pattern to that of the unadjusted probabilities (in Panel A). In the
end, the fitted model reveals a similar departure from the patterns of
incarceration implied under independence.
In order to derive that prediction, which we plot as dashed line in panel
B, we first fit a model from a sample we restrict to defendants who face only
Ki = 1, as sentence multiplicity cannot explain variation in incarceration in
this restricted sample or the weights give to the set of covariates. We then
make the out-of-sample predictions of incarceration for each offense for those
defendants who face multiple sentences. Given the predicted likelihood a given
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offense would result in jail time, we then calculate the probability that a
defendant would be jailed for at-least-one offense.
Individual sentences are clearly not independent across the number of
guilty verdicts. Having absorbed much of the variation in sentencing through
our econometric specification, we are inclined to interpret this pattern as
evidence of differential treatment rather than to selection into multiple
offenses. Moreover, that estimates fall off of the application of single-verdict
sentencing patterns to multiple-verdict sentencing we interpret as evidence of
sentence severity decreasing in the number of coincident guilty verdicts.
3.3.2 Sentence Length
In most jurisdictions, when defendants face multiple sentences it may be
determined that they are to be served at the same time (known as concurrent
sentences), with the longest period implying the length of sentence to be serve.
Around the world, judges are given wide discretion in determining whether a
sentence is to be served consecutively or concurrently. This is true of
Pennsylvania sentencing, with the relevant guidelines simply noting that “In
determining the sentence to be imposed the court ... may impose them
consecutively or concurrently,” (Cirillo, 1986).71 However, it is generally
believed that when sentencing defendants with multiple offenses, judges should
not consider offenses independently—instead they are to assure that the total
punishment matches the offending behavior. That said, the scope for
discretion is relatively large, and the implications of the assignment of
concurrent sentencing likewise.
While discretion over how to sentence multiple offenses is large, it is
bounded by two types of sentencing behavior: that when all offenses served
71 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9721 (West).
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consecutively or when all offenses served concurrently. Many jurisdictions have
coded a preference for one of these boundaries into law as a “presumption”
that operates as a default rule. In these jurisdictions, a judge must explicitly
override such presumption in order to assign a different type of sentence.
While the Federal courts and may state jurisdictions maintain a presumption
in favor of concurrent sentences (LaFave et al., 2000), there is no codified
presumption under Pennsylvania law, with the relevant rule of criminal
procedure stating, “When more than one sentence is imposed at the same time
on a defendant ... the judge shall state whether the sentences shall run
concurrently or consecutively,” (Pa. R. Crim. P. 705(B)).72
In Figure ?? we describe the assignment of concurrent sentences across
defendants with different numbers of coincident guilty verdicts. Across all
defendants convicted of at least two offenses receiving any jail time, roughly
30-to-70 percent receive a concurrent sentence for at least one offense (Panel A)
and of those who receive at least one concurrent sentence, 40-to-70 percent of
their total sentence length is to be served concurrently (Panel B). As we intend
to pursue the modeling of race-specific effects of multiplicity, we’ve plotted
these for black and white defendants separately—this suggests that there are
differences in the allocation of concurrency across race, favoring white
defendants in some dimensions, while favoring black defendants in others.
In Panel A of Figure 17 we plot unadjusted “consecutive” and “real”
sentence lengths by the number of coincident guilty verdicts—real-sentence
lengths are 80 percent of consecutive-sentence lengths. Of course, for those
facing single sentences, there is no like notion of concurrent sentencing.
However, we retain these defendants in fitting models of sentence lengths.73
72 Prior to 1996, Pennsylvania did maintain a presumption that certain sentences should
run concurrently unless the judge said otherwise (Pa. R. Crim. P. 705(B)).
73 When we condition on defendants with more than one offense, real-sentence lengths are
64 percent of consecutive-sentence lengths, on average.
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For context, we also plot (with dashed lines) the percent difference in
predicted sentence lengths under the assumptions that all offenses are to be
sentenced 1) independently and 2) consecutively (or concurrently)— that is,
under the assumptions all offenses are sentenced under a mandated
presumption of consecutive, or concurrent, sentencing. Here, that amounts to
modeling sentence lengths for a sample of Ki = 1 defendants (consecutive and
real sentence lengths are identical for the Ki=1 population), and using those
coefficient estimates to project sentence lengths for all K ≥ 2 defendants to
determine the predicted values under the assumption of consecutive
sentencing. To generate the predictions under the assumption of concurrent
sentencing, we use the estimates generated from the Ki = 1 model to make
out-of-sample predictions of offense sentence lengths for all offenses for
defendants who face multiple guilty verdicts. We then set the predicted actual
sentence length for the defendant as the maximum offense sentence length
which was estimated for the defendant. We then plot the percent differences
between the counterfactual consecutive and concurrent sentences and those
found when Ki = 1.
Next, to find the direct effect of offense multiplicity on sentence length,
we model the length of defendant i’s total sentence across all Ki guilty
verdicts as
Ki∑
k=1
Consecutive Sentenceicj = α + ΩKi + X
′
iβ + γj + εij , (7)
and
Ki∑
k=1
Real Sentenceicj = α + ΩKi + X
′
iβ + γj + εij , (8)
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where
∑Ki
k=1 Consecutive Sentenceicj and
∑Ki
k=1 Real Sentenceicj captures the
consecutive sentence assigned to defendant i seen by Judge j, and the
associated sentence length that accounts for the judge’s decision to allow some
or all of the consecutive sentence to be served concurrently. Of interest to us,
again, are the fixed effects that absorb how sentencing decisions change across
multiple sentences (i.e., the ΩKi).
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In Panel B of Figure 17 we report the differences in sentence length due
to the number of coincident guilty verdicts defendants face. Specifically, we
plot the effect of multiplicity relative to the rates experienced by defendants
who face single sentencing decisions—for both consecutive and concurrent
sentences lengths.
For context, we also again plot (with dashed lines) counterfactuals of the
estimated effects under the assumptions that all offenses are to be sentenced 1)
independently and 2) consecutively (or concurrently). To generate the
counterfactuals effects, we net out the differences in the counterfactual
consecutive and concurrent sentence lengths (those used to generate the
counterfactuals in Panel A) that can be explained by differences in
observables, leaving the remaining differences as the counterfactual effects due
to multiplicity.
The results in Panel B closely match those found in Panel A. With
respect to the consecutive sentences defendants receive, we see the monotonic
increase we anticipate with additional sentences. With that, while we see
general similarity in the model’s predicted impact across multiple sentences
and the derived impact under independence with an assumption that all
74 In Xic we again include race fixed effects, age (in five-year bins), and i’s “prior-record
score” to absorb any effect of criminal history on sentencing. We also include the average
statutory minimum-sentence lengths for defendant i’s crimes, his average offense-gravity
score, and controls for the fixed contributions specific to crime types. We also control for
judge γj fixed effects.
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Figure 17: How do consecutive and concurrent-adjusted sentence lengths change
across the number of coincident guilty verdicts?
(a) Unadjusted means across multiplicity (b) Estimated effects of multiplicity
Notes: In Panel A we plot the average total consecutive and total real (concurrent-adjusted) sentence
length that a defendants receive across the number of coincident guilty verdicts faced by defendants. In
Panel B we plot the estimated impact of the number of coincident guilty verdicts on the total consecutive
and total real (i.e., the percent difference relative to those facing only one sentencing decision)—we control
for race fixed effects, age (in five-year bins), and i’s “prior-record score” to absorb any effect of criminal
history on sentencing. We also include the average statutory minimum-sentence lengths for defendant i’s
crimes, his average offense-gravity score, and controls for the fixed contributions specific to crime types.
We also control for judge γj fixed effects. In Panel A, the dotted lines represents the counterfactual
percent differences in sentence length, while in Panel B the counterfactuals show the percent differences in
sentence length that is specifically due to multiplicity in sentencing, that one would find under
independent consecutive or concurrent sentencing.
sentences are to be served consecutively, the estimated effects routinely run
higher, which is consistent with complementarities in sentencing offenses
increasing total length.75
With respect to real-sentence length—accounting for part of all of the
multiple sentences to be served concurrently—we see strong evidence of the
significance of these determinations. For those with two sentences, the
allocation of concurrency amounts to multiplicity leading to a 44-percent
shorter (52 days, on average) real sentence length compared consecutive
75 We fail to reject at the 95% level that a quadratic trend better fits the data than a
linear trend.
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sentence length—this reduction increases to 65-percent for those defendants
with seven offenses (930 days). However, it is also evident that concurrent
sentence lengths significantly depart from what one would expect under
independent concurrent sentencing, suggesting a lack of any (even unofficial)
presumption for concurrent sentencing within the Courts. Across
Ki ∈ {2, 3, . . . 7} the average effects of offense multiplicity on concurrent
sentence lengths is between 43- and 58-percent smaller than one find under an
assumption of independent consecutive sentencing and between 47- and
151-percent larger than one would find under an assumption of independent
concurrent sentencing.
As it is evident judges use discretion while determining whether the
sentences for a defendant are to be served concurrently or consecutively, and
as the literature has well established judicial discretion can lead to racial gaps
and bias (Rehavi and Starr, 2014; Mustard, 2001), it is natural to consider
how discretion over how to sentence multiple offenses may influence racial
discrepancies.
3.3.3 Racial bias in sentencing
While racial gaps in sentencing are routinely found, it is not always clear
what racial gap is being measured, and how it relates to individual offenses or
defendants as a whole. For example, in their sample when estimating
sentencing outcomes, Mustard (2001) includes all offenses for defendants and
implicitly assumes independence between them, and Demuth and
Steffensmeier (2004) ignores multiplicity by discarding all but the most-serious
of a defendant’s offenses. Noting that “sentencing across charges for a given
case will be highly correlated,” Abrams et al. (2012) also discards all but the
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most severe charge per defendant.76 Our analysis of Pennsylvania’s Common
Pleas Courts rulings between 2007 and 2016 is consistent with this overall
expectation, revealing systematic gaps in overall defendant sentencing
outcomes by race of roughly thirteen percent. However, we find significant
variation in the magnitude of racial bias, both across defendants with varying
number of coincident guilty verdicts, and across measurements of consecutive-
and real-sentences.
In Figure 18 we plot estimated differences in sentencing outcomes by
defendant race—here, we can again relax earlier restrictions on β across
Ki ∈ {1, 2, . . . 7} sentencing decisions and estimate models separately for all
Ki. While we implicitly control for the number of sentences the defendant
faces, in producing differences by race we absorb any systematic differences in
sentencing outcomes that are explained by the types of crime, and the number
of each.77
First, as has been evidenced in the literature, the treatment of black
defendants is consistently to their detriment. We demonstrate this empirical
regularity generally holding across all levels of multiplicity. For example,
across all Ki, black defendants face roughly 8- to 12-percent higher likelihood
of receiving jail time than their white comparators (Panel A).
In panels B and C of Figure 18, we consider the extensive margin,
plotting the estimated racial gaps in consecutive-sentence lengths and
real-sentence lengths. This reveals an important distinction in the experienced
differential in the sentencing outcomes of black defendants with multiple guilty
verdicts.
76 Lim et al. (2016) reveals that some defendants in their sample have multiple offenses—it
is not clear how they are treated.
77 In doing so we are implicitly assuming that outcomes are additive in the number of
within-crime-type offenses a defendant has been found guilty of. We find similar results when
we allow outcomes to by quadratic in counts by crime type.
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Figure 18: How does the black–white gap in sentencing defendants change
across the number of coincident guilty verdicts?
(a) Racial gap in incarceration (yes/no)
(b) Racial gap in total sentence lengths (c) Racial gap in total sentence lengths,
conditional on being incarcerated
Notes: In each panel, we plot impact estimates associated with race from seven different models of
defense-level observations. In all panels, we control for race fixed effects, age (in five-year bins), and i’s
“prior-record score” to absorb any effect of criminal history on sentencing. We also include the average
statutory minimum-sentence lengths for defendant i’s crimes, his average offense-gravity score, and
controls for the fixed contributions specific to crime types. We also control for judge γj fixed effects.
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Namely, accounting for the assignment of concurrent sentencing reveals
large increases in the differential treatment of black and white defendants. In
fact, in consecutive sentence length one is forced to conclude that the gap in
sentence length is insignificant among those facing five or more sentences.78 At
the same time, as the systematic assignment of concurrent sentencing is more
generous to white defendants than to black, the “black–white” gap in
real-sentence lengths is increasing through this same range—while black
defendants face 12-percent longer sentences when K = 1, the gap in
concurrently adjusted sentence length (Real) is 16 percent at K = 2, and
increases to as much as 18 percent (at K = 6). Across Ki ∈ {2, 3, . . . 7}, we
find 5-percent smaller to 48-percent larger racial discrepancies than that found
when K = 1.
In Panel C we condition again on the defendant receiving at-least some
jail time—we find larger discrepancies in the sentence lengths received by
black defendants when we account for the use of concurrent sentencing,
though the confidence intervals largely overlap. Compared to the racial bias in
sentence length of 2 percent found when K = 1, racial biases in real sentence
lengths are 110 to 427 percent larger across Ki ∈ {2, 3, . . . 7}.
3.4 Conclusion
Between 2007 and 2016, thirty-one percent of defendants in the Common
Pleas Courts of Pennsylvania were brought before a presiding judge with
multiple sentences. Yet, existing analysis of criminal sentencing largely ignores
any potential co-dependencies across multiple sentences—either assuming that
all such sentences are determined independently and jeopardizing the internal
validity of estimates independently across offenses for a given defendant. This
78 The range in estimates across Ki is roughly 5- to 12-percent longer sentences for black
defendants.
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assumption, however, deserved to be explored.
We examine how multiplicity of offenses influence sentencing outcomes.
We find strong evidence of judicial discretion in the decision to assign
sentences to be served consecutively or concurrently, with multiplicity in
offenses leading defendants to receive concurrent sentences significantly longer
than what would occur under a scheme of concurrent sentencing, but
significantly less than what would be found under consecutive sentencing.
We find disturbing evidence that racial gaps in sentencing also vary across
defendants by their number of offenses. We know from prior literature that
sentences are level different for black defendants, on average. We demonstrate
that the use of concurrent sentencing—typically left to the discretion of
individual judges—drives “black–white” gaps in outcomes further apart for
defendants who face multiple sentences. Among those facing single sentences,
black defendants face 12-percent longer sentences. Yet, accounting for the
non-random allocation of concurrences, the gap in sentence length increases,
with black defendants with two offenses experiencing 28 percent longer gaps.
The results have far-reaching implications—in the sentencing literature,
but also in policy. We provide cautionary evidence that analyses can fall short
of the fuller understanding of sentencing outcomes without addressing
multiplicity i multiplicity. In our analysis, this reveals larger discrepancies
between black and white defendants than would be found when both only
looking at defendants with one offense, and when not accounting for
concurrences in sentencing.
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APPENDIX
Chapter II
Including Mean-Other-Sentence in the baseline estimation equation
allows the average sentence of other defendants in defendants’ sentencing
cohorts to impact defendants’ sentences. However, alternative elements of the
sentences of other defendants may impact defendants’ sentences. I re-run the
baseline specification, additionally allowing the maximum and minimum
sentence length of other defendants in defendants’ sentencing cohorts to
impact defendants’ sentences. That is, using the previously discussed
predicted sentence lengths, I calculate Max-Other-Sentence and
Min-Other-Sentence as the maximum (minimum) predicted sentence length of
other defendants in a sentencing cohort. Note, the values of
Max-Other-Sentence, Min-Other-Sentence, and Mean-Other-Sentence are
identical for defendants in sentencing cohorts of two, and linear combinations
of each other for defendants in sentencing cohorts of three, leaving little
variation for separate identification. To account for this and allow for a wider
range of effect types, I allow the coefficients to vary by the number of
defendants in a sentencing cohort. I present the results in Table A1.
As shown in Specification 1 in Table A1, the coefficient on
Mean-Other-Sentence is slightly larger in magnitude, but does not statistically
change with the inclusion of Max-Other-Sentence and Min-Other-Sentence as
control variables. The coefficient on Min-Other-Sentence is negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting defendants receive shorter
sentences as the “least bad” other defendant in their sentencing cohort
receives a longer sentence. While statistical precision is lost when the variables
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Table A1: Joint Effects of Mean-, Max-, and Min-Other-Sentence
(β ∗ 102) Sentencing Cohort Measure
Mean *# Other Max *# Other Min *# Other
Specification 1
1.75* − 0.01 − -1.26* −
(0.69) − (0.15) − (0.55) −
Specification 2
1.84 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.30 -0.32**
(1.00) (0.22) (0.28) (0.02) (0.74) (0.11)
Notes: The coefficients capture the average change in months in a defendant’s sentence
due to a one-month increase in the mean (max, min) sentence of other defendants in
the defendant’s sentencing cohort. In Specification 1 (2), the parameters are not (are)
allowed to vary by the number of defendants within a sentencing cohort. Estimated
bootstrapped standard errors which are allowed to cluster by judge are shown in
parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
of interest are allowed to vary by the number of “others” in the sentencing
cohort (Specification 2 in Table A1), the overall pattern of results remains the
same. However, the coefficient on Min-Other-Sentence decreases in magnitude
and looses statistical significance, while its interaction with the number of
others is statistically significant and negative, suggesting the negative
relationship between defendants’ sentences and the minimum sentence of other
defendants in their sentencing cohort increases in strength as the size of the
cohort increases. Nonetheless, Mean-Other-Sentence continues to be an
impactfull measure.
Additionally, I display the results of the entire primary analysis with
Max-Other-Sentence or Min-Other-Sentence as the primary variable of interest
in Table A2. Results are qualitatively similar to the baseline results.
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Table A2: The Role of Max-Other-Sentence and Min-Other-Sentence on Sen-
tencing Outcomes
Estimate on Max-Other-Sentence
Defendant Race
All Black White
C
o
h
o
rt
R
a
ce
All .004∗∗ A .005∗∗ .003∗∗ B
(.001) (.002) (.001)
Black .002∗ C .004∗∗ .001 D
(.001) (.002) (.001)
White .004∗∗ .000 .004∗∗
(.001) (.002) (.001)
Estimate on Min-Other-Sentence
Defendant Race
All Black White
C
o
h
o
rt
R
a
ce
All .003 A .008 .000 B
(.004) (.007) (.004)
Black .005∗ C .013∗ .001 D
(.002) (.007) (.002)
White .001 -.008 .005
(.007) (.008) (.008)
Notes: The left (right) table displays the estimated coefficients on Max (Min)-Other-
Sentence in Analyses A, B, C, and D. In Analysis A, the coefficient captures the
average change (in months) in a defendant’s sentence due to the maximum (minimum)
other sentence of defendants in their sentencing cohort being one-month longer. In
Analysis B (Analysis C), the effects are allowed to vary by defendant (cohort) race,
and in Analysis D, by both defendant and cohort race. Each of the four models
are estimated independently for each dependent variable. Estimated bootstrapped
standard errors which are allowed to cluster by judge are shown in parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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Figure A1: The Role of Sentencing Cohorts (Minimum Sentence)
(a) Baseline Results (b) Defendant-Race Heterogeneity
(c) Cohort-Race Heterogeneity
(d) Defendant- and Cohort-Race Hetero-
geneity
Notes: Notes: Panel A displays the coefficient on Mean-Other-Sentence in a
regression on a defendant’s maximum sentence. The coefficient captures the average
change (in months) in a defendant’s sentence due to a one-month increase in the
mean sentence of other defendants in the defendant’s sentencing cohort. In Panel B,
the coefficient is allowed to vary by defendant race. Panel C displays the coefficients
on cohort-race-specific Mean-Other-Sentence in a regression on a defendant’s
maximum sentence. The coefficient captures the average change (in months) in a
defendant’s sentence due to a one-month increase in the mean sentence of other
defendants (of a given race) in the defendant’s sentencing cohort. In Panel D, the
coefficients are allowed to vary by defendant race. 95% confidence intervals derived
from bootstrapped standard errors, allowed to cluster by judge, are shown.
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